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"The past is behind, learn from it.
The future is ahead, prepare for it. The present is here, live it.
Myth, memory, history-these are three alternative ways to capture and account for an elusive
past, each with its own persuasive claim."
Warren I. Susman
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
The Study: Serbian Political Culture
For many Serbs their nation’s past presents a pretext for their present political reality.
The past defines what the present represents and what the future will be like. The past remains
deeply engrained in Serbian political culture manifesting itself in the national and cultural
identity of each Serb.
In this thesis I examine those mediums that enable past events and institutions to shape
present-day Serbian political reality. I begin with the hypothesis that events and institutions of
the Serbs under the Ottoman Empire shaped the political and cultural realities and identities.
Events, like the Battle of Kosovo, and institutions, like the Serbian Orthodox Church, continue to
play a substantial role in defining Serbian political and cultural identity. I define the Battle of
Kosovo as a crucial moment in Serbian national history which influenced the Serbs to develop a
sense of cultural self in opposition to the occupying Ottoman Muslim forces. Under the
Ottomans, the Serbian Orthodox Church promoted the idea that God, manifesting himself at the
Battle of Kosovo, made the Serbs his chosen people. Throughout this thesis I look for clues of
the Battle of Kosovo in Serbian history. Specifically, I analyze the political culture of the Serbs
during different historical periods- during the rule of the Ottoman Empire, in the semiindependent and later de jure independent Serbian state, in communist Yugoslavia, and finally
under the regime of Slobodan Milošević.
Analyzing Serbian political culture throughout different historical periods allows us
better to understand the causes behind the Serbs resistance to cultural, social and political change
in the present. For example, many Serbs continue to resist Western political ideas of liberalism
and individualism, despite culturally being exposed to them not only in the early Serbian
6

nineteenth century state but also in present-day Serbia. Furthermore, many Serbs continue to
support communal and patriarchal values in their social and political relationships. By
examining the causes of communalism and patriarchy, and how these two ideas are manifested in
Serbian society, we are able better to understand Serbian political culture.
Research Methodology and Literature Review
I have approached my research question from a combination of historical, political and
sociological perspectives. By analyzing historical and sociological texts I have established that
Serbian political culture is predominantly communal and patriarchal. Using this as my starting
point I have looked selectively in my sources for clues and signals of the influence of the Battle
of Kosovo, but also the Serbian Orthodox Church, on Serbian political culture and identity.
Please note that in this thesis I represent only one aspect of Serbian political culture.
My research is qualitative and interpretive. I have based it mainly on secondary sources,
which include historical, political, and sociological sources. The primary sources that I have
used include Serbia’s Constitutions from the early nineteenth century and onward, and official
European Union documents.
A secondary source that I have used extensively in my research is A History of Modern
Serbia 1804-1918 written by Michael Boro Petrovich, a well-respected scholar on Balkan
history. In A History of Modern Serbia 1804-1918 Petrovich examines the history of the Serbs
from the First Serbian Uprising until the Treaty of Versailles in 1918. Petrovich uses both
primary and secondary sources in his book. Employing a historiographic and interpretive
approach, Petrovich offers an in-depth analysis on the socio-cultural and political developments
in Serbian society.
For more information on the political development of the Serbs I turned to Alex N.
Dragnich’s The Development of Parliamentary Government in Serbia. Dragnich, a political
7

scientist, examined the development of Serbian political culture from the period of the First
Serbian Uprising to the development of parliamentary government in early twentieth century. In
Dragnich’s work he argues that the Serbs political development was rather intense in that they
successfully created a democratic political system in a very short period of time. Dragnich
argues that the Serbs, as a national group, were pre-wired for democracy in society due to the
strong tradition of communalism in Serbian society, which was brought about by the zadruga
system of social organization.1 Serbian communalism was free of sharp class divisions and
ethnic or regional differences, while it, however, nurtured strong sentiment of national identity
which existed long before Serbian nation-building occurred.2
Socio-Anthropologist Ivan Čolović in The Politics of Identity in Serbia presents Serbian
national and cultural identity through an ethnological and sociological study of Serbian cultural
and political identity. Čolović examines the origins of the Serbian national myth, which he finds
in discourse linked to the Battle of Kosovo namely concerning ideas on heroism, time, national
identity and political borders. Čolović argues that the biggest obstacle to democratization in
Serbian society is the continual reinforcement of the Serbian national myth.
To substantiate further some of Čolović’s arguments on Serbian national and cultural
identity, I relied on Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for an Eternal Identity by
Christos Mylonas. In Mylonas’ work he examines the complex interaction between the Serbian
Orthodox Church and the Serbs from the period of Ottoman colonialization to the present in
pursuit of defining Serbian national and cultural identity. Mylonas argues that the Serbian
Orthodox Church sacralized Serbian national identity, creating out of the past a “social constant
and a lineage of thought in the life of the Serbian individual and his community".3
1

Ibid., 117-118.
Dragnich, The Development of Parliamentary Government in Serbia, 115-116.
3
Mylonas, Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals, xi.
2
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I relied on 'Saviours of the Nation' Serbia's Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of
Nationalism by Jasna Dragović-Soso, a professor of political science, to illustrate the role that
Serbian intellectuals have played in Serbian national revival from the beginning of the decline of
communism to the Milošević regime. Dragović-Soso argues that the Serbian intellectuals
nurtured Serbian national identity during the communist period and under Milošević making
them the saviors of the Serbian nation. Dragović-Soso bases her research on both secondary and
primary sources, including many personal interviews.
Chapter Outline
In Chapter One of this thesis I examine the relevant events and institutions in Serbian
society during the rule of the Ottomans that influenced the transformation of Serbian cultural
identity and political reality. My conclusion is that the Battle of Kosovo represents the defining
moment in Serbian national history. The Battle of Kosovo, signifying the defeat of the powerful
Ottoman army over the Serbs, led the Serbian Orthodox Church to initiate its campaign designed
to preserve Serbian cultural and religious identity, leading to the formation of the Serbian
national myth. Significant of this period is also the role of the zadruga social structure in Serbian
society as the chief unit of social organization. Most importantly, the zadruga social structure
promoted a form of communalism in Serbian society which continues to shape Serbian political
culture and national identity. Finally, I conclude that patriarchy became a central feature of
Serbian cultural identity and later political culture after the Battle of Kosovo and with the
conquest of the Ottomans, who brought traditional Islamic cultural values to the Balkans.
In Chapter Two I provide an in-depth analysis on how the political culture of the Serbian
rural population shaped political, social and cultural processes in society in the semi-independent
Serbian state. In early Serbian political history, the Serbian rural population supported those
political interest groups who successfully tapped into the patriarchal aspect of Serbian cultural
9

identity and political culture. The Serbian rural population represented the most numerous social
group in early Serbia and each political interest group perceived its support as central to gaining
political power. In this period, Serbian society witnessed the development of constitutionalism
as the overarching body of law promulgated to promote law and order in society and bring the
state ideologically closer to Western Europe. Nonetheless Serbian constitutionalism came about
from a tension between external forces emanating from Western European political ideology and
philosophy, and indigenous ideas originating from patriarchy and other conservative values.
These competing forces caused a rift between the intellectuals and the rurals in Serbian society
and further divided the two groups.
In Chapter Three I examine the gradual spread and support of socialist-populist values
and principles in Serbian society. The Serbian rural population widely accepted socialistpopulist ideas and values due to their communal but also patriarchal political culture leading
them to support the Radical Party for over four centuries. In this period independent Serbia
experienced continual pressure from Austria-Hungary to abandon its foreign policy interests.
Only with Russia’s assistance was Serbia able to expand its territory southward and
southwestward. Within the Austria-Hungarian Empire the South Slavs increasingly began to
support the Yugoslav social movement as the ideological precursor to Yugoslavism.
In Chapter Four I study the ideological underpinnings of communist Yugoslavia and the
gradual de-legitimization of the communist political system by Serbian intellectuals. Most Serbs
readily accepted communism because of their communal but also patriarchal political culture and
identity. While the majority of Serbs nurtured their Yugoslav identities, the Serbian intellectuals
intensely questioned the decentralization processes of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia
(CPY), communicating to the Serbs that the CPY was not representing the interests of the
collective Yugoslav nation.
10

Finally in Chapter Five I examine those political and cultural elements in Serbian
political culture that Slobodan Milošević tapped into in order to gain and remain in power.
Milošević recognized the communalism but also the patriarchy present in Serbian society and
presented himself first as a pro-Yugoslav communist leader, and later as a nationalist. Otpor, a
youth-based opposition movement supported by the United States, also took advantage of the
communal character of Serbian political culture and rallied the Serbs to overthrow Milošević and
his regime, which occurred on October 5, 2000 when a hundred thousand Serbs flooded
Belgrade’s streets and stormed into the Parliament Building demanding Milošević’s resignation.
.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE SERBS UNDER THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Introduction
To best understand contemporary Serbian political culture, we must examine relevant
events and institutions in Serbian society during the Middle Ages and under the Ottoman
Empire. My objective in this Chapter is to examine the political and cultural mediums, resulting
from Serbia’s historic events and institutions, that continue to influence contemporary Serbian
political culture.
The defeat of the Serbs by the Ottomans in the late fourteenth century at Kosovo Polje
continues to play a great role in contemporary Serbian political culture. This event represents the
Serbs loss of political independence and the influx of Islamic political, cultural and social norms
and values which inherently transformed Serbian cultural identity and political reality. The
Serbian Orthodox Church, a predominantly religious institution, responded to this defeat by
transforming itself into a semi-political institution dedicated to protecting Serbian cultural and
religious values from Ottoman Muslim culture. To preserve Serbian Orthodox Christianity, the
Church manufactured the Serbian national myth founded on the event of the Battle of Kosovo,
which later served as the platform for the Serbian national revival movement in the nineteenth
century and for the rise and spread of religious nationalism in the twentieth century. The Serbian
national myth on the Battle of Kosovo continues to play an active role in contemporary Serbian
political culture.
Ottoman rule continues to influence contemporary Serbian political culture through the
medium of general resistance towards government authority, which in this thesis I call
baksheesh. Under Ottoman political, military, and administrative control the Serbs often evaded
Ottoman laws, particularly in regards to the collection of taxes, which the Ottoman forces levied
12

higher for those Serbs who refused to convert to Islam. Baksheesh continues to exist in Serbian
society resulting in a high degree of corruption and preventing the full implementation of the rule
of law.
The event of the defeat of the Serbs leading to Ottoman occupation in the late fourteenth
century continues to influence contemporary Serbian political culture via the medium of gender
relations. The influx of Ottoman Islamic cultural norms and values significantly changed the
position of women in Serbian society compared to their social position in the Late Middle Ages.
Although the Yugoslav communist regime managed to improve the position of women in
Serbian society, it secured only minor advances since Serbian political culture remained
patriarchal. The religious nationalism of the Milošević regime and the Serbian Orthodox Church
strengthen patriarchy in Serbian society further traditionalizing gender roles and relations.
The Myth: The Battle of Kosovo
'When we first heard people talk of political myths, they seemed to us so raw, so comical,
so crazy and senseless that we found it hard to take them seriously. Now we know that
this was a grave mistake. We must not make it a second time. For this reason it is
necessary to undertake research into the origin, structure and technique of political
myths.'4
The role of the Serbian Orthodox Church significantly changed in medieval Serbian
society in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Established in 1219, the Serbian
Orthodox Church served as a proto-religious institution concerned with consolidating Eastern
Orthodoxy among the Serbs until the early fifteenth century.5 As depicted in Figure 2, medieval
Serbian rulers commissioned the Serbian Orthodox Church to create literary works and to build
architectural masterpieces in order to strengthen the Empire’s territorial claims and to reveal its
the spiritual and materialistic foundations. For example, the Serbian Orthodox Church under
4

Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, 296.
Prior to the formation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the thirteenth century, the Serbs pledged their religious
allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Eastern Orthodox Church.
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Stefan Nemanja, father of the Nemanjić Dynasty, erected eight different monasteries, with
Studenica Monastery in Serbia's Raška region currently on UNESCO's list of World Heritage
Sites (see Figure 3). 6
However, with the defeat of the Serbs by the Ottomans, the Serbian Orthodox Church
became a socio-cultural institution, serving as a repository and sanctuary of Serbian cultural and
historical identity. The Serbian Orthodox Church became the cultural and religious protector of
the Serbs from Islam. According to Mylonas, the Serbian Orthodox Church successfully
preserved Serbian cultural and historic identity among the rural population, primarily because
this large segment of the population lacked much frequent interaction with foreign cultures other
than Ottoman culture.7
In order to prevent the Islamization of the Christian Serbian Orthodox population, the
Serbian Orthodox Church presented to the Serbs a myth that aggrandized their national past.
Since members of the Serbian Orthodox Church were unable to denounce openly Islam, they
manufactured a myth based in part on Serbian Eastern Orthodox religious doctrine, the glories of
the Serbs in medieval Serbia and the disastrous consequences of the Battle of Kosovo. The
Serbian Orthodox Church synthesized religion and history resulting in the creation of a national
myth.
The myth of the Serbian Orthodox Church conveyed to the Serbs that God represented a
central aspect of their cultural and religious identity, that in fact all Serbs were transcendental,

6

The Serbian Empire under medieval ruler Tsar Stefan Dušan of the Nemanjić Dynasty desire particular mention.
Under Tsar Stefan Dušan, the Serbian Empire stretched from the Danube in the north to present-day central Greece
in the south, and from the Adriatic Sea in the west to regions of present-day Bulgaria in the east. The Serbs
expanded and strengthened the Empire thanks to a growing mining industry, the flourishing of various trades,
political and social developments that were upheld by a modern judicial system based on statutory legal code. The
Serbian Empire disintegrated in 1355 with Tsar Stefan Dušan's death into several rival feudal principalities.
7
Mylonas, Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals, 55.
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and that God choose them to defend Christianity from the further spread of Islam.8 For example,
to transcendalize Serbian identity, the Serbian Orthodox Church added Serbian historic rulers to
the existing array of Serbian Orthodox saints in its ecclesiastical calendar.9 The Church glorified
Serbian medieval rulers and knights, such as Tsar Stefan Dušan and Miloš Obilić, giving them
mythical and transcendental qualities and placing them as central figures in Serbian epic poetry.
The Serbian national myth dissuaded many Serbs from converting to Islam because it gave them
pride in their religious and cultural identity.
Central to the narrative of the Serbian national myth is the Battle of Kosovo. The Battle
of Kosovo occurred in 1389 at Kosovo Polje during which, as the Serbian Orthodox Church
alleges, the powerful Muslim Ottoman Army crushed the Christian Serb forces. According to
the myth, God manifested himself during this particular Battle because Kosovo is abundant in
Serbian Orthodox monasteries and churches. At Kosovo Polje God revealed to the Serbs that
they were his "chosen people" and that because of the defeat, the Serbs collectively had to defend
Christianity from Islam. Kosovo Polje became a spiritual but tangible space enabling the Serbs
to connect to their ancestors by immersing themselves in the blood of Tsar Stefan Dušan and
Miloš Obilić, and allowing them to become transcendental.10 The myth of the Battle of Kosovo
provided the Serbs with a physical tangible space that enabled them to connect with God through
historical narratives. The myth also offered to the Serbs a mental space where they could find
refuge from their daily hardships under the Ottoman political and military regime.
The Serbian Orthodox Church used epic poetry to introduce and promote the
mythological Battle of Kosovo among the Serbs. For example, in the epic below, "The Fall of

8

Ibid., 60.
There are fifty-eight saints in the Serb Orthodox ecclesiastical calendar of which eighteen are tsars, kings and
queens, and princes and lords. See Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 13.
10
Čolovic, Politics of Identity in Serbia, 13.
9
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the Serbian Empire", the Serbian Orthodox Church sought to communicate to the Serbs the idea
that it was part of God’s plan that they be defeated at Kosovo Polje as God’s chosen people.
Shall I choose the earthly kingdom?
Or shall I choose the heavenly kingdom?
The earthly kingdom lasts only a brief time,
But the heavenly kingdom always and forever."
So the Tsar chose the heavenly kingdom ...
Then the Turks mounted their attack against Lazar.
And the Serbian Prince Lazar perished,
Together with his entire army,
Seventy-seven thousand in number,
And all was holy and honorable
And acceptable to gracious God...
As depicted also in Figure 1, this epic narrative of the Serbian Orthodox Church conveyed to the
Serbs the promise that they would be rewarded for their religious and political sacrifices under
the Ottoman forces by eventually receiving the heavenly kingdom which, lasted "always and
forever" unlike the earthly one that they in fact lost as a result of the defeat. Čolovic in The
Politics of Identity in Serbia argues that Lazar's choice of the heavenly kingdom is transformed
into a strategy of only the "temporary and necessary denial of the main aim, that of achieving the
Kingdom of Earth".11
Modern historical analysis shows that the Serbian Orthodox Church, for the most part,
skewed the facts of the battle at Kosovo Polje in order to manufacture the Serbian myth with the
goal of preventing the Islamicization of the Serbs. Historical research shows that two alliances
of feudal aristocrats consisting of mixed forces of Christian Orthodoxy and Islam fought at the
battlefield in Kosovo. Unlike the Serbian Orthodox Church’s narrative, the Battle of Kosovo
was not fought between two clear-cut factions of Serbian Orthodox forces and the Muslim

11

Čolovic, Politics of Identity in Serbia, 12.
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Ottoman army.12 The Serbian Orthodox Church also has argued that all Serbian states ceased to
exist after the Battle of Kosovo, however, historical research presents evidence that Serbian
vassal states continued to exist to the north along the Morava and Danube rivers well into the
mid-fifteenth century.13 The Battle of Kosovo does not represent the decisive battle that led to
the collective fall of the Serbs.14
The Battle of Kosovo continued to live among the Serbs despite their liberation from the
Ottoman Empire. In the mid-nineteenth century the Battle of Kosovo served as the platform for
the Serbian national revival movement as Serbian intellectuals perceived it as the central event in
Serbian national history.
Similar to the Serbian Orthodox Church under the Ottomans, the Serbian intelligentsia
played the central role in defining Serbian national identity, which it did by further
institutionalizing the Battle of Kosovo. The Serbian intelligentsia, emerging mainly from large
urban areas and under the influence of Enlightenment ideas, incorporated the Battle of Kosovo
into the ecclesiastical calendar of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Coincidentally the actual Battle
of Kosovo fell on June 28th which was St. Vitus Day, the holy day of martyr St. Vitus. St. Vitus
Day became Vidovdan according to Serbian linguistic tradition. Similar to other European states
of the period, the Serbian intellectuals also were under the influence of romanticism and its ideas
of nationalism.
The importance of Vidovdan in Serbian national and cultural identity throughout the
twentieth century should not be underestimated. In 1914 on Vidovdan, Archduke Franz
Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip in protest of Austria-

12

Mylonas, Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals, 152.
Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 6.
14
The Serbian Orthodox Church fails to mention in its rhetoric the Battle of the Marica in 1371 which brought many
more Serb causalities than did the Battle of Kosovo.
13
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Hungary's policies and practices towards the Serbs. Also on Vidovdan, in 1948 the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia officially split from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which resulted
in a geopolitical shift in the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1989
on Vidovdan, Slobodan Milošević gave his famous speech at Kosovo Polje, the site of the Battle
of Kosovo, calling on the Serbs to reclaim their territorial right to Kosovo. Moreover, on
Vidovdan, in 2001 Milošević was deported to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in the Hague on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Also on
Vidovdan, in 2006 the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro split into two separate independent
states signifying the final dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. As depicted in Figure 4,
Vidovdan has played a central role in Serbian national history and collective consciousness.
Serbian academic Dragan Nedeljković has argued that the Vidovdan experience reminds
the Serbs that the main cause of their defeat at the Battle of Kosovo was disunity and conflict,
two elements that must cease to exist in Serbian society.15 Furthermore, Nedeljković argues that
Tsar Lazar's 'holy Kosovo pledge is a pledge of harmony and unity of Serbdom' which applies to
the 'historical moment when the survival of the Serbian nation and its State is in doubt'.
As in the mid-nineteenth century, the Battle of Kosovo played an important role in
Serbia's national revival movement of the twentieth century. Serbia's national revival movement
of the twentieth century was initiated largely by Milošević and his followers, some of whom
were members of the Serbian intelligentsia, along with the Serbian Orthodox Church. Through
the framework of the Battle of Kosovo, Milošević brought up the question of the political future
of the Kosovo Province which most Serbs continue to claim as their national and cultural
homeland. In 1989, on Vidovdan Milošević gave his famous speech at the site of the Battle of
Kosovo, at Kosovo Polje, next to Gazimestan, a monument erected in 1953 by the Communist
15

Nedeljković, Reči Srbima u smutnom vremena, 103.
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Party of Yugoslavia in the shape of a medieval tower to commemorate the fight of the Serbs
against the Ottoman military forces. Significantly, Gazimestan is located adjacent to Gračanica
Monastery which was erected in 1321 by Serbian King Stefan Milutin as a territorial claim. On
Gazimestan inscribed is Tsar Lazar's "Kosovo Curse":
"Whoever is a Serb and of Serb birth,
And of Serb blood and heritage,
And comes not to fight at Kosovo,
May he never have the progeny his heart desires,
Neither son nor daughter!
May nothing grow that his hand sows,
Neither dark wine nor white wheat!
And let him be cursed from all ages to all ages!" 16
Standing next to Tsar Lazar's "Kosovo Curse", Milošević appealed to the Serbian nation to
reclaim its collective property right to Kosovo through an unarmed battle for economic, political,
social and cultural progress which may at some point in the future become armed. 17 Milošević
also suggested that the Serbs in Kosovo increase their birthrate which continues to be low
compared to that of Albanians in Kosovo.18 By bringing up the Serbian national question of
Kosovo in his speech, Milošević promoted nationalism among the Serbs, which he later used to
stay in power.
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, Milošević along with the Serbian Orthodox Church
sponsored various entertainment media and cultural events centered on the theme of the Battle of
Kosovo to promote nationalism among the Serbs. For example, in 1989 Milošević endorsed folk
singer Gordana Lazarević to issue the song "Vidovdan" which illustrates the Serbs inherent
sentiment of collective right to Kosovo throughout its verses:
16

Since 1999 Gazimestan has been under the protection of KFOR peacekeeping forces due to the attacks of
Kosovan Albanian rioters.
17
Olga Žirojević, a well-known Serbian academic, commented on how Milošević made it appear as though the
Serbs were reliving the "Battle of Kosovo" as a result of various forces attempting to seize Kosovo, along with
socialism, away from the them. See Žirojević, Kosovo in the Collective Memory, 207-208.
18
It should also be noted that during Milošević's speech he appealed to all Yugoslavs to support a unitary
Yugoslavia.
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I'm looking at heavens, centuries going by,
For old memories that's the healing
Wherever I go I will be back, you know.
Who can rip away Kosovo from my soul, Vidovdan!
Wherever I go I will be back, you know.
Who can rip away Kosovo from my soul, Vidovdan!
Eternal flame burning in our hearts
For truth of battle shall live forever.
Wherever I go I will be back, you know.
Who can rip away Kosovo from my soul, Vidovdan!
Wherever I go I will be back, you know.
Who can rip away Kosovo from my soul, Vidovdan!
Lord, forgive us all of our sins.
Give the courage to our sons and daughters.
Wherever I go I will be back, you know.
Who can rip away Kosovo from my soul.
Wherever I go I will be back, you know.
Who can rip away Kosovo from my soul, Vidovdan!19
The Serbian Orthodox Church promoted nationalism through the Battle of Kosovo framework by
distributing pins, posters, and other paraphernalia illustrating the Battle during the Vidovdan
celebrations. In addition, under the Milošević regime, the Serbian Orthodox Church embarked
on a campaign to revive the Serbian Orthodox faith among the Serbs and to spread nationalism
by exhibiting the bodies of Serbian heroes who had lost their lives during the Battle of Kosovo.
The Milošević regime and the Serbian Orthodox Church worked in concert to gain more power
in Serbian society by reviving Serbian national identity and religion among the Serbs.
Despite the bad history that the Battle of Kosovo and Vidovdan have brought to the
Serbs, the Battle of Kosovo continues to play an important role in contemporary Serbian political
culture. During the campaigns for the February 2008 presidential elections in Serbia, eight out
of nine presidential candidates, including President Boris Tadić, declared that Kosovo ought to
remain within Serbia proper because it represents the source of Serbian national, cultural, and

19

Translation taken from wikipedia.org, Vidovdan.
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spiritual identity.20 However, during the Vidovdan celebrations in 2009 Tadić, while serving his
second term, took on a more conservative stance warning that although Vidovdan will always
remain an important element in Serbian identity, it ought to never be celebrated again as it was in
1989 under Milošević, an event which triggered political and economic sanctions for Serbia, the
Yugoslav wars, NATO's 1999 bombing campaign, and the United Nation's declaration of
protectorate status for Kosovo.21
During the 2009 Vidovdan celebrations, the Battle of Kosovo was commemorated most
vividly at Gazimestan monument where several thousand Serbs from Serbia proper and Kosovo,
along with the Serbian Diaspora, celebrated fallen Serbian heroes, such as Tsar Lazar, by
participating in liturgies dedicated to them. Serbs from all around the world came to Kosovo, the
Mecca of Serbian Orthodox Christianity, despite the Kosovan Albanians’ declaration of
independence. On Vidovdan, Serbian Orthodox Church clergy addressed the Serbs that Kosovo
would always be the heart of Serbia, just as it was six hundred and twenty years ago.
Communalism: The Social Structure of the Zadruga and Baksheesh
Along with the thematics of the Battle of Kosovo, the Serbian Orthodox Church
successfully preserved Serbian cultural identity under the Ottomans due to the social
organization of Serbian society. Serbian society was organized around the zadruga- a
community of about one hundred rural men and women connected by patrilineal kinship who
shared land, money, and livestock with each other. The internal political organization rested on a
hierarchal system of social organization in which the eldest and most capable Serbian male
decided on important questions on behalf of the other zadruga members. Zadruga members
lacked contact with languages and cultures other than Turkish or Ottoman because zadruga
20
21

B92.org, Predsednički izbori (Presidential Elections).
Ibid.
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existed mainly in rural areas where foreigners rarely spent much time. These factors allowed the
zadruga Serbs to preserve and nurture their Serbian cultural identity from the influence of
Ottoman Islamic culture.22
In the late nineteenth century Svetozar Marković argued that the communal aspect of the
zadruga social structure represented the epitome of socialism and democracy in Serbian political
culture. Marković, the standard bearer of Serbian socialism, maintained that the communal
living and sharing of land, money, and livestock in the zadruga represented the earliest form of
Serbian socialism. Zadruga living rested on communal principles that became integral to Serbian
political culture over the centuries and ideologically prepared the Serbs for nineteenth century
socialism and later communism. Moreover, Marković argued that zadruga members had the
"ethical traditions of an egalitarian folk democracy which brought into a natural and moral
harmony the dignity and worth of the individual with the needs of the community."23
Under Ottoman rule zadruga Serbs developed methods of resisting Ottoman authorities
whose rule they perceived as illegitimate. According to Vucinich, Serbian rural folk distrusted
the Ottoman authorities, particularly the police agents and the tax collectors, and fought against
them for centuries.24 Vucinich calls Serbian distrust of the Ottoman government baksheesh,
which in Serbian means gratuity.25 To survive in Ottoman-run society the Serbian peasant
coupled subservience with cleverness which he used to evade Ottoman authority through
unethical and illegal means.26 The Serbs developed the notion that cheating and stealing from
the government was justified.27

22

Mylonas, Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals, 92.
Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia 1804-1981, 377.
24
Vucinich, Some Aspects of Ottoman Legacy, 89.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
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Serbian resistance to Ottoman authority became a feature of Serbian cultural identity that
continues to persist even in the twenty first century. Serbian resistance of authority hindered the
development of a modern bureaucratic Serbian state in the nineteenth century as the Serbian rural
folk distrusted the bureaucracy and obstructed its activities. During the communist period, the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia was unable to cope with the resistance of its constituents of
government despite the regime's stringent laws.28 The Milošević regime failed to address the
issue of resistance to authority because it relied on the corruptive practices of its constituents,
and its own support of underground criminal groups and networks, to stay in power.
After the fall of Milošević in October 2000, the Serbian government under the energetic
leadership of Zoran Djindjić embarked on a journey to eradicate the practices of the Serbs'
resistance to government authority, which I will know call corruption. Serbia's first wave of
anti-corruption initiatives occurred under the Djindjić government when it initiated a widespread
crackdown on Serbia's organized crime network that previously was supported by the Milošević
regime but had shifted its allegiance to Djindjić just days before the regime fell. Serbia's main
criminal organization, the Zemun Clan, greatly disapproved of Djindjić's anti-corruption
activities and assassinated him in March 2003.
The Serbian government has made significant strides in its fight against corruption during
its second wave of anti-corruption initiatives. Serbia's second wave of anti-corruption initiatives
has been more institutionalized than the first wave and is conducted according to the principles
and objectives set out in its Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union.
Most progress has been made in institutional political processes, such as the ratification of the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the adoption of a National Strategy for
Combating Corruption, and the passing of legislation making public and private sector
28
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corruption, extortion, the abuse of office, money laundering, and bribery all violations of the
Serbian Criminal Code. As of 2009, Serbia's most corrupt policy areas are public procurement,
privatization and other large budgetary agencies along with taxation, customs and licensing, and
the financing of political parties.29 Although the institutional process of passing legislation has
been successful, the actual implementation of these rules and regulations remains slow.30
Serbia's Anti-Corruption Agency, which was created to ensure the implementation of Serbia's
anti-corruption rules and regulations, is scheduled to begin operations in 2010.
Patriarchy: A Shift in Gender Relationships
The status of Serbian women in society significantly deteriorated under the Ottoman
Empire. In medieval Serbia women could rule as queens and empresses while the Serbian
Orthodox Church allowed women to divorce their husbands if deserted or abandoned.31 The
Ottoman Empire revoked these freedoms. Under the Ottomans, Serbian Christian women often
shared the same fate as their Serbian Muslim sisters- they lived in isolation, "deferred to men
with blind subservience, and in some districts adopted veils and other pieces of Muslim female
dress."32 Some Serbian Christian males adopted the tradition of male polygamy.33
Along with the influence of Ottoman Muslim culture on gender relations in Serbian
society, the myth of the Battle of Kosovo and its progeny of male heroes and martyrs reinforced
patriarchy among the Serbs. Under the influence of Battle of Kosovo mythology, Serbian
society formed the impression that all Serbian men were inherently transcendental warriors
whose role was to defend Christianity from Islam while all Serbian women were to serve them in
the name of Serbdom. In the epic poem from the Battle of Kosovo cycle, Kosovka Devojka, or
29
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The Kosovo Girl, the central female character hurries to the battlefield after the Serbs are
defeated to mend the wounds of the fallen heroes with water, wine and bread, however, her
efforts are fruitless as each warrior dies shortly after proposing marriage to her.
Epic poetry on the Battle of Kosovo reinforced patriarchy in Serbian society that became
a permanent feature in Serbian cultural and political identity that continues to exist. Annoyed
with their position in Serbian society, some Serbian women took advantage of the communist
character of the partisan forces and fought alongside men to liberate Serbia from Nazi occupation
and to improve their position in society.34 Under the communist regime, although the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) made some progress in advancing the status of women it
was unable to eliminate widespread patriarchy in society. CPY argued that gender equality
would arise from class equality and addressed the issue of gender equality in Yugoslavia's 1946
Constitution:
Women enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of state economic and social life.
Women are entitled to a salary equal to that of men for the same work, and enjoy special
protection in the labour relationship. The state particularly protects the welfare of
mother and child by the establishment of maternity hospitals, children’s homes and day
nurseries, and by ensuring the right to paid leave before and after confinement.35
In 1977 CPY admitted that the regime's program of gender equality failed to eradicate patriarchy
from Serbian society.36 Furthermore, CPY party officials argued that the root causes of
patriarchy were a traditional value system dictating the role of men and women in society,
religion, and other conservative prejudices.37 Despite the communist regime’s efforts in
promoting gender equality through education and legal action, it failed to eradicate the deeply
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instilled patriarchy in Serbian society.38 Nonetheless, the CPY continued to argue that patriarchy
would be eradicated once class equality was achieved.
Nonetheless, the post-war rebuilding of Yugoslavia and the political reality of the cold
war demanded that Serbian women contribute all their skills and energy to the communist state,
similar to the Serbian women who lived in the zadruga social structure under the Ottomans.
Serbian women worked mainly in the social services and the textile sectors, and in the 1980s
represented eighty percent of the total number employed in these two sectors but lacked
representation in academics, the judiciary, and politics.39 Despite some advances in their
professional lives, Serbian women still experienced gender discrimination from patriarchal
Serbian society.
The lurking presence of patriarchy re-surfaced with the religious nationalism of the
Milošević regime and the Serbian Orthodox Church. In the post-communist era the Serbian
Orthodox Church re-emerged as a key power player in Serbian society. It zealously promoted
patriarchy “to save the Serbs” by campaigning to re-traditionalize gender relations in society.
The Church advocated that Serbian men re-awaken their inner Tsar Lazar and fight at the
battlegrounds of Bosnia and Croatia while it urged women to bear more children to "revitalize"
the Serbian nation. For example, the Serbian Orthodox Church accused mothers who had lost
their only child in the Yugoslav wars of sinning against themselves, the Serbian nation, and God
because they had procreated only one child.40 The Church revived the Battle of Kosovo by
arguing that the growing number of Albanians in Kosovo threatened the Serbian nation with
extinction.

38

Vucinich, Some Aspects of Ottoman Legacy, 92.
Ramet, Gender Politics in Western Balkans, 94.
40
Papić, Women in Serbia, 161.
39

26

The Milošević regime joined the Serbian Orthodox Church in its campaign of promoting
patriarchy among the Serbs. In 1990, the regime introduced the "Law on Population Policy" that
gave married couples with four or more children the right to receive extra financial assistance
from the government but punished those who were either married couples with only one child or
married couples who were both older than thirty years of age without children with higher taxes.
To further promote its agenda, the Milošević regime changed the 1974 abortion law to prohibit
abortions after a woman's tenth week of pregnancy, except when authorized by a physician,
psychologist, or social worker.41 The regime passed a law allowing Serbian public health
insurance to cover recovery from alcohol addiction and plastic surgery but prohibited coverage
for abortions, which made it extremely difficult for Serbian women to have abortions because the
cost of one equaled the sum of two average paychecks in Serbia. By promoting these policies,
the Milošević regime coerced women into becoming "pregnant and barefoot in the kitchen", or
the term "Kinder, Küche, Kirche" (or "Children, Kitchen, Church") that the Germans used in the
nineteenth century to describe a woman's role in society, promoting further the deeply instilled
patriarchy in the collective psyche of the Serbian nation.
Since the fall of the Milošević regime and Serbia's commitment to European Union
membership, Serbia's democratically-elected government has been trying to improve the position
of women in Serbian society. In February 2009 Serbian parliament adopted a national strategy to
promote gender equality by focusing on five areas where improvement is deemed necessarywomen's health and economic position, the representation of women in public and political
positions, gender equality in education, the suppression of violence against women, and the
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elimination of gender stereotypes in the media.42 The European Union has expressed concern
that Serbia still lacks a mechanism to report violations which occur against women's rights and
that the government still must pass its proposed Gender Equality Act.
Conclusion
Contemporary Serbian political culture continues to be shaped by relevant events and
institutions from Ottoman rule. The result of the Battle of Kosovo led the Serbian Orthodox
Church to become the protector and nurturer of Serbian cultural identity by manufacturing the
Serbian national myth. The basis of the Serbian national myth is the idea that the Serbs are
God’s chosen people, that they are transcendental. Under this theory, the Serbian Orthodox
Church succeeded in dissuading many Serbs from converting to Islam and in preserving Serbian
cultural and religious identity. The Church promoted the myth by the teachings of epic poetry in
rural areas mainly inhabited by Serbs. The Battle of Kosovo continued to play a central role in
Serbian political culture and identity in the nineteenth century when Serbian intellectuals used it
as the basis of the Serbian national revival movement. Moreover, the Battle of Kosovo served as
the platform for the spread of religious nationalism during the Milošević regime.
The zadruga social structure preserved Serbian cultural identity because it was cut off
from the influence of foreign cultures and languages, aside from Turkish. Communally
organized, it promoted a form socialist-populism that became an integral part of Serbian political
culture and identity. In addition, the zadruga represented a breeding ground for baksheesh,
resistance to government authority, a practice that unfortunately became part of Serbian cultural
identity.
With the arrival of the Ottomans gender relations significantly changed within Serbian
society. Prior to the influx of Ottoman norms and values, Serbian women enjoyed a multitude of
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freedoms that disappeared. Ottoman invasion brought patriarchal values to the Serbs which
became central to Serbian cultural identity and later Serbian political culture. Although the
status of women in Serbian society has improved compared to the Ottoman period, Serbian
women continue to face discrimination in both the public and private spheres.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE SEMI-INDEPENDENT SERBIAN STATE
Introduction
In this Chapter I examine the political, socio-cultural, and legal developments in the
Principality of Serbia with the goal of better understanding the challenges that the Serbs faced
during the state and nation building processes under the Ottoman forces. In this period, urban
Serbian elite, but also the rural population, faced the challenge of limiting the rule and power of
Serbia's royal leaders and political interest groups. Although the Serbian rural population still
lived in the zadruga social structure and largely nurtured communal and egalitarian values, it
became vulnerable to the paternalism of Serbia's first political leaders and interest groups.
Patriarchy reinforced paternalism. In the early development of the Serbian state the Serbs
deemed it necessary that strong authoritarian leaders lead the nation to independence from the
Ottoman Empire as opposed to democratically elected leaders (see Figures 5 and 6).
In this period of early state development, the Serbian government initiated a campaign to
modernize the Serbian state by implementing a bureaucratic apparatus, developing
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and creating a sound foreign policy to serve the Serbian
state for future decades. Serbian society stratified into three new social classes, the rural class,
the bureaucracy and merchantry, and the intellectuals. Western European ideas and capitalism
brought about new challenges to Serbian society.
Early Serbian Political Developments
The political sentiment of the Serbian rural folk often determined the outcome in the
struggle between Serbia's monarchs and political interest groups for political power. After the
First Serbian Uprising Serbian rural folk and the elites rushed to fill the political vacuum caused
by the ongoing withdrawal of the Ottoman military and administrative forces. Both groups
30

aspired to install a political system to benefit their particular social group.43 Under Ottoman rule
the zadruga social structure reinforced communalism but also paternalism, through the rule of the
male elder, in Serbian political identity and culture. At public gatherings for determining the
political system that would ensue, zadruga elders lobbied for a system akin to a representative
democracy that would give each male zadruga member the opportunity to represent his group in
the political assembly. Zadruga elders believed that Serbian rural folk were entitled to influence
policymaking due to their strenuous efforts in liberating the Serbs from Ottoman power.
The elites, on the other hand, adopted a paternalistic approach and argued that they ought
to have all political decision-making power because they better understood the political climate
of the period. Despite the elites alleged superiority in resources, the Serbian rural folk
successfully took charge, however, failing to install a representative democracy but electing the
rule of one man.
The Serbian rural population gave their political support to Karadjordje, or Black George,
a former Austrian Freicorps soldier and a livestock merchant, who led the Serbs in their struggle
against the Ottoman forces in the First Serbian Uprising and who promised to liberate further the
Serbs from Ottoman power. Political realism trumped the idealism of the Serbian rural folk.
The Serbian rural folk believed that in order to win in their struggle for freedom they would need
to confer all political decision-making power to Karadjordje.44 To stay in power, Karadjordje
often relied on patriarchy and paternalism. He reminded the Serbian rural population of the
heroic martyrs of the past, such as Tsar Lazar, who had fought courageously to defend the Serbs.
The Serbian rural population argued that Karadjordje was a man of the people, a genuine
democrat who sometimes had to rule with an iron fist in order to free the Serbs from Ottoman
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power.45 Karadjordje justified his authoritarianism, and general dismissal of the rule of law and
constitutionalism, by arguing that it was rather easy to implement the rule of law in a warm room
but very difficult in the face of war.46
While the Serbian rural folk politically supported Karadjordje the elite sought to disrupt
his power and to implement their own political rule. The Serbian elites complained that
Karadjordje refused to share power with them and argued that the Belgrade Pashalik ought to be
fragmented into several smaller districts, a structure that would have resembled the organization
of the medieval Serbian vassal states. Unlike the Serbian elite, Karadjordje, representing
Western European ideas on state formation, argued that the Pashalik ought to remain whole. In a
bid for political power, the Serbian elites lobbied the rural population for support but were
unsuccessful. The elites organized the Governing Council, which consisted of twelve members
who were to make important political decisions on the future of the Pashalik. Refusing to share
political power with the Serbian elites, Karadjordje denounced the Governing Council, rejecting
a form of organization that most likely would have given the Serbian rural folk greater
representation in the political process. In 1813 Karadjordje abandoned his activities in the
Pashalik and fled to the Austrian Empire for safety.
Despite the Serbian rural population's support of Karadjordje, this social group refused to
give legitimacy to the authoritarian rule of Miloš Obrenović. Like Karadjordje, Miloš was "a
man of the people", he actively participated in the First and Second Serbian Uprisings, and made
it well-known that the survival of the Serbs as an independent nation depended on his survival as
ruler of the Serbs.47 However, despite his paternalism towards the Serbian rural folk, Miloš
never received political support from this social group despite his tactics, which included giving
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zadruga members vested interests in vacant Ottoman land.48 Nonetheless, the Serbian rural folk
continued to dislike Miloš's authoritarianism.
Discontent with the lack of political rights and freedoms the Serbian rural population
supported Miloš’s political opposition. To stay in power and as a result of facing political
pressure Miloš established the Council of State in 1826 which was intended to be a government
branch that would oversee Serbia's internal affairs and its foreign relations with the Great Powers
of the era- the Ottoman, Austrian, and Russian Empires. Miloš reserved veto power over all the
decisions of the Council which disintegrated shortly after being established.
The Great Powers recognized the political turmoil in the Serbian Principality as an
opportunity to interfere in Serbia's internal politics and to re-assert their presence in the region.
In order to demonstrate that the Ottoman Empire was still the dominant geopolitical power
player in the region the Porte imposed two hatti sheriffs on the Serbs. As a response to Ottoman
muscle-flexing, Miloš brought the Constitution of 1835, which the Austrian Empire quickly
declared illegitimate since it gave the Serbs too many rights and freedoms. The Austrian Empire
worried that its subjects would follow suit and ask for similar liberties.49 Moreover, the Russian
Empire as well opposed the Constitution of 1835 because Miloš had failed to ask Tsar Nicholas I
for approval before promulgating it. Miloš responded to the criticisms of the Great Powers by
replacing the Constitution of 1835 with the Turkish Constitution in 1838, which he largely
ignored.
Attempting to regain political control in the Serbian Principality, the Ottoman Empire
lobbied the elites, most of whom joined the Constitutionalist political group, to promote Ottoman
agenda in the region. The Constitutionalists favored the modernization of the Principality and
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the implementation of the rule of law which would ideologically and structurally bring the
Serbian state closer to Western Europe. Although the Porte preferred disorder and chaos over
order and the rule of law in the Serbian Principality, it saw the Constitutionalists as its green card
to control in the region. The Constitutionalists could promote their political agenda as long as
ultimate decision-making on important issues, such as foreign policy, was left to the Porte.
Aware of the political culture of the Serbian rural population, the Constitutionalists used
paternalism to win the support of this social group. Although the Serbian rural folk was aware of
the fact that the Ottomans, from whom they were trying to gain complete independence for the
last four centuries, created the Constitutionalists in order to promote the Porte's foreign policy
interests in region, the Serbs supported the Constitutionalists because they perceived them as a
viable alternative to Miloš’s authoritarianism and appreciated their emphasis on the rule of law
and constitutionalism in society. Drawing on Karadjordje's statement, the Constitutionalists
represented the notion of "a warm room and the rule of law". By politically supporting the
Constitutionalists the Serbian rural population could have the best of both worlds.
Nonetheless, although the Constitutionalists successfully modernized the semiindependent Serbian state by establishing a bureaucratic apparatus, they failed to promote the
interests of the Serbian rural folk. In the newly developed government bureaucracy, the
Constitutionalists, for the most part, employed Austrian Serb recent émigrés from the Austrian
Empire who were literate and better educated than the Serbs in the Principality. Employees of
the Serbian state bureaucracy, along with the Constitutionalists, discounted the Serbian rural folk
as people and often referred to them as the "incompetent wards of the state".50 Petrovich argues
that the Austrian Serbs émigrés were “wastrels, vagabonds, and desperados".51 Miloš denounced
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the employees of the bureaucracy and often dismissed then as he pleased and refused to give
them regular salaries. The Constitutionalists relied on the chaos and confusion that the
modernization of the Serbian state caused among the Serbs to stay in power.
Along with the establishment of a bureaucratic apparatus, the Constitutionalists
modernized the semi-independent Serbian state by creating a foreign policy to ensure the
complete independence of the Serbian state and to strengthen Serbia's position vis-à-vis the Great
Powers. The Constitutionalists figured that for Serbia to ward off the influences of the Great
Powers and their potential territorial claims to the state, Serbia would need to establish an outlet
westward to the Adriatic Sea. The Constitutionalists also may have perceived Serbia’s potential
of becoming a regional hegemon in the Balkans after obtaining an outlet to the Adriatic Sea and
with the demise of the Austrian and Ottoman Empires.
The foreign policy of the young Serbian state first was formulated by Ilija Garašanin in
his secret memo "Načertanije", or Manifesto. In "Načertanije" Garašanin conveyed that all land
stretching from Northern Albania in the south to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the north ought to
become part of the Serbian state because this territory traditionally was inhabited by Serbs. He
believed that the Serbs on these lands had the right to political self-determination. In the postYugoslav period, many have equated Garašanin's "Načertanije" with the idea of a “Greater
Serbia”, however, scholar Josette Baer argues that Garašanin's ideas had nothing to do with
nationalism but with economic growth, which she maintains was the "typical geopolitical
direction of nineteenth century agrarian countries (which) sought territorial expansion for
economic sustainability and growth."52 In "Načertanije" Garašanin also addresses a common
union among the South Slavs on the basis of a shared language and culture. "Načertanije"
remained a secret memo until being published on the eve of the First World War.
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The Serbian rural population quickly became discontent with the rule of the
Constitutionalists and Obrenović dynasty, which it overthrew in 1842 with a large rebellion. The
Karadjordjević dynasty was re-installed under Aleksandar Karadjordjević who became Prince of
Serbia and ruled as monarch until 1858 when he was deposed due to a conflict with the national
assembly. The Obrenović dynasty returned to the throne that year under Miloš Obrenović, who
died in 1860 and left the throne to Mihailo III Obrenović who died in 1868 after being
assassinated by a member of the Serbian army. Following Mihailo III Obrenović, Milan IV
Obrenović came to the throne who ruled as King Milan I until 1889 when he abdicated in favor
of his son Aleksandar I who was assassinated in 1903 and succeeded by Petar I of the
Karadjordjević dynasty.
Like the Constitutionalists the Liberals tapped into the political culture of the Serbian
rural population in order to gain power. However, unlike the Constitutionalists, most Liberals
believed that Serbian rural folk could become active participants in a representative democracy.
The Liberals argued that folk democracy represented a significant part of the rural population's
political culture due to the peasants' experiences in the zadruga. The Liberals encouraged the
Serbian rural folk to participate in Serbia's Grand Assembly which finally gave this social group
a space to express their political will. The Liberals consisted mainly of Serbian intellectuals who
were under the influence of the European Revolutions of 1848 and believed in a common bond
among the members of the Serbian nation.
The Liberals faced political opposition from the Conservatives, another group of Serbian
intellectuals who were unable to win the support of the Serbian rural class. Most members of the
Conservatives believed that Serbian rural folk was ignorant and backward. This political faction
gained its political power from the military, the merchantry, and the state bureaucracy.
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In 1878 Serbia's foreign policy strategy of westward expansion was crushed when the
Ottoman Empire granted Austria-Hungary special rights to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the Sandzak of Novi Pazar under the Treaty of Berlin. The Great Powers, however
predominantly Austria-Hungary, the United Kingdom, and the Ottoman Empire, were
determined to prevent Serbia from establishing an outlet to the Adriatic Sea by expanding
westward. Moreover, the Great Powers also had decided to counter the spread of Russian
influence in the Balkans by giving Serbia territories known as "Old Serbia", Niš, Pirot, and
Vranje, an area that the Serbs had liberated previously from Ottoman power and which was
promised by the Russian Empire to an independent Bulgaria under the Treaty of San Stefano.53
Constitutionalism Pre-Independence
In order to understand the development of Serbian political culture it is important to
examine the development of constitutionalism and the implementation of the rule of law in
Serbian society. The decline of Ottoman political, military, and administrative power in the
Belgrade Pashalik and subsequently the Serbian Principality made the development of
constitutionalism and the spread of the rule of law a necessary feature of Serbian society.
Serbia's political interest groups, such as the Constitutionalists and the Liberals, argued that for
Serbia to become a modern state it would need to have a well-written Constitution that would
embody the rights and freedoms of Serbia's citizens and serve as the supreme law of the land.
Also, Serbia's first Constitutions served as instruments to solidify Serbia's international status as
a semi-independent state.
Despite the fact that resistance of government authority and the law was a central feature
of the political culture of the Serbian rural population under the Ottomans, Serbian rural folk

53

Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 397.

37

generally supported the implementation of the rule of law in Serbian society in the nineteenth
century. Along with the Battle of Kosovo, the Serbian Orthodox Church had educated the Serbs
on Serbian medieval history and how well Tsar Dušan's complex legal code regulated Serbian
medieval society. Although Serbian rural folk generally rejected the modernization of the
Serbian society, they supported the development of constitutionalism and the rule of law. It has
been recorded that in 1805 a Serbian peasant stated the following:
“… the law is the will of the nation. Where there is a good constitution, there is
freedom …Whereas when one or more individual rule according to there own
will, the nation dies, there is no freedom, no security, only banditry exists”54
From this excerpt we learn that the Serbian rural population understood that laws regulate society
and that they are necessary for the well-being of both the nation and the individual.
Serbia's first constitution served to limit Karadjordje's rule in Serbian society and to
assert Russian influence in the previously Ottoman-controlled Pashalik. In 1808 Russian
diplomat Rodofinkin drafted Serbia's first constitution, during his diplomatic mission to the
Belgrade Pashalik, which transferred political power from Karadjordje to a group of Serbian
elites who would govern through the Governing Senate. However, Rodofinkin's constitution
never went into force because Tsar Alexander I of the Russian Empire declared it illegitimate
since it failed to mention the Empire's right to intervene in Serbia's internal and external affairs.
After Rodofinkin's failed constitution, Karadjordje brought the Constitution of 1811
where he introduced a governing council of six ministers and a supreme court of six justices but
also proclaimed himself the hereditary, supreme ruler of the Serbs. In 1813 the Porte declared
Karadjordje's 1811 Constitution illegitimate since the Ottoman Empire still exerted political
control over Serbia.
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In 1830 the Ottoman Empire, in its exercise of muscle-flexing in the Balkans, imposed a
hatti-sherif in the newly established Serbian Principality in an effort to limit the rule of Miloš
Obrenović and to increase the authority of the Constitutionalist government. The hatti-sherif of
1830 mandated that a governing council be formed which would have veto power over all of
Miloš's political decisions.55 Although the Porte sought to remain influential over Serbia's
internal and external affairs, it mandated in the hatti-sherif that Serbia modernize by establishing
a bureaucratic apparatus, a military, and an adequate educational and healthcare system.
Miloš ignored the restrictions that the hatti-sherif of 1830 placed on his rule and the
rights and freedoms that the document gave to the Serbs. After a significant amount of pressure
from the Serbs, Miloš brought the Presentation Constitution of 1835, which was based on the
French Constitutions of 1791 and 1814.56 In this period, Western European ideas of liberalism
and democracy crept into Serbian society and many Serbs wanted similar rights and freedoms
that Western European nationas enjoyed. As a result of Miloš's political survival depending on
the acquiescence of the Serbian rural folk, he included in the Constitution a full Chapter of over
twenty articles on the individual rights and freedoms of Serbs along with a State Council to
oversee the protection of these rights.57 The Presentation Constitution also established a
National Assembly to bring the rural population into the political decision-making process and
an independent judiciary to help promote the rule of law in the Serbian Principality. However, in
1838 the Great Powers, the Austrian, Ottoman and Russian Empires, denounced the Presentation
Constitution as excessively liberal, since it contained too many progressive ideas, and ordered
Miloš to abolish it.
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The Porte interfered again in the Serbs' constitutional-making process and issued the
Turkish Constitution of 1838 that ensured Ottoman control over the Serbs by mandating that the
Ottoman forces re-establish their military and administrative command in the Serbian
Principality. Most importantly, the Turkish Constitution revoked most of the rights and
freedoms that Serbian society enjoyed under the Presentation Constitution and distanced the
Serbs from their Western European political ideals.58 The Turkish Constitution remained the
ruling constitutional document in the Principality until 1869.
In 1868 a three-man regency of fourteen year old Prince Milan Obrenović, which was
under the leadership of Jovan Ristić of the Liberals, appointed a committee of experts to draft a
new constitution for the Serbian Principality that would regulate the powers of the National
Assembly, freedom of the press, jury trials, and ministerial responsibility.59 The Large National
Assembly, which the Liberals had formed years prior, adopted the proposed Constitution in
1869, however, only after Austria-Hungary and later the Russian Empire approved of the
Constitution did the Assembly ratify it. The Constitution formally restored the Large National
Assembly and gave it legislative power whereby no law could be promulgated, repealed,
amended or reinterpreted without the agreement of the Large National Assembly.60 Threefourths of the Assembly's deputies were to be elected by virtually universal manhood suffrage
while the remaining one-fourth were to be appointed by the Serbia's prince.61 Many Serbs were
dissatisfied with the Constitution of 1869 because the document lacked rights on local selfgovernment, which were particularly important to the Serbian rural folk, and guarantees on the
freedom of press, speech and association, which were to be addressed in separate legislative acts.
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Despite these deficiencies, the Constitution of 1869 was a "great step towards constitutional
government" and it provided a governmental framework that allowed parliamentarianism to
grow in Serbian society.62
In the young Serbian semi-independent state competing indigenous and exogenous ideas
and ideologies influenced the development of early Serbian constitutionalism. Although Serbian
rural folk for the most part supported constitutionalism and the rule of law, the patriarchal
political culture of the peasantry prevented this social group from accepting the progressive
Western European ideas and political philosophies in Serbia's Constitutions. Patriarchy
commanded that political authority emanate from Serbia's ruler and not from political pluralism
and democratic rule. Moreover, communalism promoted collective rights and not the individual
rights and freedoms that Serbia's Constitutions embodied. The Serbian rural population
preferred its traditional values over the progressive values of Serbia's intellectuals that rested on
the spread of the rule of law and the development of constitutionalism.
Serbian Intelligentsia and the Rural Folk
Several social divisions existed within Serbian society under the Ottoman Empire.
Ottoman military and administrative forces divided the conquered Serbian population according
to the Ottoman millet religious system by placing those Serbs who had converted to Islam into
the powerful Musulman millet while designating the Christian Serbs to the Rum millet, a
separate religious community of Christian Orthodox peoples from the Balkans. Most Christian
Serbs lived in rural regions in the zadruga, as mentioned in Chapter 1, while Muslim Serbs and a
very limited number of Christian Serbs, whom I will refer now to as just Serbs, lived in urban
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areas. Also, it is important to note that many Serbs lived across the Danube and Sava rivers in
the neighboring Austrian Empire.
As the Ottoman Empire became less powerful in the eighteenth century, an elite group of
Serbs emerged from the Serbian rural and urban populations under the Ottomans but also from
the Austrian Empire and introduced foreign ideas and philosophies to the Serbs. These
exogenous ideas and philosophies emerged from Western European political ideologies and
philosophies of the Enlightenment Period that rested on the ideas of nationalism, the rights and
freedoms of individuals, and the role of the state in society. Serbian intellectuals, namely Vuk
Stefanović Karadžić and Dositej Obradović, adopted many of the ideas of Western European
political thought and made them a part of the Serbian state and national framework. Along with
others, Karadžić, who was a linguist and political philosopher, introduced the idea of the Serbian
nation to the Serbs that was based on the theory of linguistic unity.63
Karadžić argued that the Serbs spoke Štokavian, a form of dialect that belongs to the
South Slavic group of languages, and that all South Slavs who spoke Štokavian belonged to the
Serbian nation, including those in the Austrian Empire. Along with institutionalizing Serbian
nationality, Karadžić's ideas influenced Serbian youth to promote the unification of Štokavian
speaking people in Austria-Hungary but also the creation of a united South Slav state on the
basis of a shared South Slav language.64 In the mid-nineteenth century many Serbian
intellectuals returned to Serbia from their government-sponsored studies abroad, though mainly
in Western Europe, and brought into Serbian society the ideals that Karadžić and Obradović first
introduced.65 Some of the intellectuals focused on cleansing the Serbian language and culture
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from influence of the Ottoman Empire, while many others became politicians and other civil
servants.
The position of the Serbian rural population in Serbian society greatly changed with the
semi-independence of the Serbian state which led the Serbian peasantry to disapprove through
local resistance of the progressive Western European ideas and political philosophies introduced
by the Serbian intellectuals . While the Serbian intellectuals provided the ideological support for
the formation of the Serbian state, Serbian rural folk provided the "manpower" necessary to
liberate Serb-populated territories from the Ottomans forces. Nonetheless, despite their great
involvement in the liberation wars, the Serbian peasantry lost much of the social and political
power that it had enjoyed under the Ottomans in the zadruga social structure. Petrovich argues
that the resulting position of the Serbian peasantry in the semi-independent Serbian state was
paradoxical because with state independence social groups usually become more politically
autonomous.66 Moreover, Petrovich suggests that this phenomenon was due to the nation's
transition from a "patriarchal folk democracy to an impersonal modern political machine."67 The
Serbian rural population demonstrated its aversion towards Serbia's new political system by
verbally attacking and denouncing the government bureaucracy, the Serbian peasants referred to
the employees of the bureaucracy as frauds, traitors and nemci, "Germans".68
In this period, Serbian rural folk denounced progressive Western European ideas also
because they were ideologically distant to the patriarchal political culture of the Serbian
peasantry. The introduction of these ideas by the Serbian intellectuals initiated a battle between
the opposing forces of traditionalism, which belonged to the peasantry, and modernity, which the
intellectuals sought ardently to promote. Traditionalism in Serbian political culture included
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religiously-based social stratification, communal decision-making, collective rights, resistance of
authority, and many other factors diverging from modernity. The progressive ideas of the
Serbian intellectuals introduced the social stratification of Serbian society based on skill and
economic opportunity, individual rights and freedoms, the acceptance of bureaucrats and other
civil servants as authority, and the development of constitutionalism and the rule of law. Serbian
rural folk deduced that they lacked any commonality with the intellectuals and bureaucrats due to
differences spanning from tangibles such as dress and speech mannerism to intangible factors
such as social challenges, opportunities and aspirations.
Conclusion
Patriarchy and paternalism marked the early days of Serbian political development.
Serbia’s political rulers, beginning with Karadjordje, tapped into Serbian political culture in
order to earn the support of the Serbian rural population. For example, both Karadjordje and
Miloš Obrenović proclaimed themselves the fearless leaders in the Serbs’ fight for freedom
against the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the Constitutionalists presented themselves as the
educated saviors of the Serbs promising to modernize the Serbian state and bring it ideologically
closer to Western Europe. All three interest groups relied on the blind faith that Serbia’s rural
population vested in their leaders.
With de facto independence the Serbs received their first constitutions, however, only
with the approval of the Great Powers. De facto independence exposed Serbian intellectuals, but
also merchantry, to Western European political ideologies and philosophies which often clashed
with the conservative values of the Serbian peasant.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
SERBIA POST-INDEPENDENCE
Introduction
In this Chapter I provide an analysis on how the political culture of the Serbs in the
second half of the nineteenth century influenced the rise and spread of socialism as a legitimate
political ideology among the Serbian rural folk and enabled the collective acceptance of
communism in the twentieth century. I also examine the foreign policy interests of the Great
Powers of the era, namely Austria-Hungary, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire, in the
Balkans in order to understand more effectively how the interests of these Empires influenced
the processes of state-building in Serbia. Finally, in this Chapter, I explore the origins of
Yugoslavism as the ideological predecessor to the Yugoslav state.
The immediate post-independence period of the Serbian state marked the onset of a new
type of political system rooted in socialist ideology that persisted in Serbian politics until the
establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The communal aspect of the
zadruga social structure influenced the Serbian rural population to support politically the
Radicals political party due to its ideology of "narodnism", or populism, which rested on the idea
of giving more power to the peasantry through increased local self-government. The Radicals
believed that the social organization of the zadruga represented an embryonic socialist system
that ought to be replicated on a grander scale.
Post-independent Serbia continued to face similar foreign policy challenges, aside from
the influence of the waning Ottoman Empire, like semi-independent Serbia still under the grip of
the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary's foreign policy interests in the Balkans continually
clashed with those of Serbia preventing the state from expanding westward and realizing an
outlet to the Adriatic Sea, and also from further developing economically. Nonetheless, Russia's
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foreign policy interests of increasing its influence in the Balkans benefited Serbia by supporting
the enlargement of the Serbian state to counter Austria-Hungary's claims in the region. Due to
the support of the Russian Empire, Serbia expanded southward which resulted in the size of its
territory almost doubling which threatened Austria-Hungary and ultimately set the stage for
World War I (see Figure 8).
Under the influence of the Revolutions of 1848, South Slav political philosophers in
Austria-Hungary re-created a pan-South Slav political movement that was based on the idea of
forming of a Yugoslav state within Austria-Hungary under the ideology of Yugoslavism.
Yugoslavism served as the founding ideology for the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in
1917 and the Communist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945.
Communalism: A Re-birth
With the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 Serbia became a de jure independent state which
resulted in a change of political organization among the various political factions within Serbia
(see Figure 7). Serbia's independence finally freed Serbia of the Porte's perpetual political
influence on the state’s internal affairs and its organization. Political parties could now formally
exist which thereby allowed various political factions to organize themselves better throughout
the state and to encourage the political participation of Serbia's rural folk in the political process.
As Serbian rural folk became more engaged in the political process, Serbian political culture
became more egalitarian as the communal aspects of Serbian political identity trumped
patriarchal values in an environment of equal economic opportunity for the rural folk. Political
pluralism led to the spread of democracy and the fortification of the representative democracy
form of political system in Serbia, bringing the state, but also the nation, ideologically closer to
Western Europe.
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Before the rural population pledged its widespread support to the Radical Party, this
group elected the representatives of the Progressive Party into government only to become
disappointed with the Progressives' subsequent treatment of the rural population. The
Progressives were a group of foreign-educated intellectuals, offshoots of the Conservatives, who
argued that in order for Serbia to become a modern state the political and economic interests of
the Serbian rural folk, as the most numerous social group, had to be represented in government.
After only a brief period in office, the Progressives determined that the members of the Serbian
rural population could never become participants in the political decision-making process despite
their tradition of folk democracy and as a result neglected the political and economic interests of
this group which they had previously energetically campaigned to represent.
Socialist ideas emerged into Serbian society by way of Russian "narodnism" as espoused
by Svetozar Marković. The political ideology of the Radicals emerged from the ideas embodied
in Russian "narodism", or populism, a 1860s and 1870s social movement of Russian intellectuals
who advocated socialist principles, focusing primarily on the improvement of social and
economic living standards for Russia's poorest peasants.69 "Narodism" was introduced into
Serbian society by Svetozar Marković after studying in St. Petersburg on a scholarship given by
the Serbian government in the 1860s during which he became active in the Russian socialist
movement. During his studies, Marković took interest in the teachings of Nikolay
Chernyshevsky, founder of "narodism", who in his literary work advocated the overthrow of the
aristocracy and the implementation of a socialist system based on the structure of the traditional
peasant commune. Applying narodism principles, Marković identified the Serbian peasant with
the industrial worker and argued that it was the responsibility of the Serbian intelligentsia to lead
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the rural folk to the establishment of a social order with the zadruga as its nucleus.70 Marković
hoped that Serbia might "skip capitalism and pass into capitalism directly via the zadruga" while
criticizing the Liberals and the Constitution of 1869 that civil liberties were not an end to be
accomplished but a means to the "transformation of the socioeconomic system and the political
regime that rested on it." 71

Similar to Chernyshevsky's ideas on Russian "narodism",

Marković's theoretical approach to the socialist peasant revolution in Serbia rested on the
communal and egalitarian aspects of the political culture of the Serbia's rural population as
presented through the zadruga social structure.
Some years after Marković's death his followers tapped into the communal and
egalitarian political culture of the Serbian rural folk to spread the socialist movement in Serbia's
rural regions. Marković's followers, Adam Bogosavljević and Pera Todorović, presented his
ideas to Serbia's peasantry by stressing the communal aspects of Marković's socialism and
advocating for the creation of a peasant state where Serbian peasants would enjoy the same
political and economic rights as the bureaucracy and the merchants.72 However, since
Marković's followers also were aware of the patriarchal nature of Serbian political culture they
avoided mentioning the aspects of socialist thought that would have been repugnant to the
peasantry.
The members of the Radical Party, led by Nikola Pašić, connected with the mainly
illiterate Serbian rural folk through symbolism. In line with the Radicals teachings on socialist
ideology, Party leaders bridged the divide between themselves, as Serbia’s educated elite, and
the illiterate peasants by using symbolism to communicate effectively with them, similar to the
Serbian Orthodox Church under the Ottomans when through symbolism it narrated epic poetry to
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promote the myth on the Battle of Kosovo. The Radicals established district offices throughout
towns in Serbia and in the spirit of communal decision-making used symbols to explain the
current events political and the underlying ideas of the Radical Party's platform. For example, to
highlight to the importance of constitutionalism in society, Party leaders explained that people
without a constitution were like nomads who lived on the bare soil under an outstretched canvas,
people with a bad constitution were like men who lived in small and miserable huts which were
full of smoke, darkness, cold, and dirt, while people with a good constitution were like men who
had large and well-lit rooms filled with warmth.73 It is important to note that the Radicals were
able to organize oral discussions and to gain the support of the rural population through such
means in part due to the right to freedom of expression that existed as a result of the Constitution
of 1869.
Resistance to authority still was alive in Serbian political culture so that when King Milan
refused to recognize the overwhelming victory of fifty-three percent of the Radicals over the
Progressive Party in the 1883 elections the rural population revolted against him. Milan, who
was pro-Austrian, believed that the Radicals received support from the Russian monarchy to
promote Russian influence in Serbia and refused to allow them their allotted seats in Serbian
Parliament. To supply the Serbian Army with weaponry in Serbia's 1876 war with the Ottoman
Empire, Milan issued an order that each peasant relinquish all of his weaponry to the state for
and that he would be reimbursed monetarily later. After failing to reimburse monetarily the
Serbian rural folk and to recognize the overwhelming victory of the Radicals, the peasantry
responded in the Radical-controlled Timok region of eastern Serbia by boycotting the state
bureaucracy and destroying public establishments resulting in the death and imprisonment of
many Serbs. The Timok Rebellion represents an important event in nineteenth century Serbian
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history because it demonstrates the collective determination and political maturity of the Serbian
peasants to reclaim their rightful political and economic position as the liberators of the Serbian
nation under the Ottomans.
After the Radical party split into two separate political parties the Serbian rural folk
supported the political group who advocated for more local self-government and lower taxes for
the peasants. Due to the support of the Serbian peasantry, the Independent Radicals stayed in
power under Nikola Pašić and promoted socialist ideology benefiting the Serbian rural
population until the end of World War I in 1918 when the party dissolved.
From the First and Second Serbian Uprisings in the early nineteenth century until the
beginning of the twentieth century, Serbian society experienced a period of intense political,
social and economic change. Scholar Alex Dragnich argues that Serbian political culture, rooted
in patriarchy but also communalism and egalitarian principles, allowed for the political
modernization of the Serbian state.74 Unlike in the cases of the Germans or the Italians, the
Serbs' political culture developed from a sentiment of national identity that the Serbian Orthodox
Church had nurtured for centuries which facilitated nation-building. In addition, Serbian
political culture was communal and absent of rigid class divisions, particularly in the first half of
the nineteenth century. State-building and nation-building came naturally because Serbian
political culture was free of major ethnic or regional differences, despite the apparent existence
of local differences and loyalties.75 Also, the rural population's tradition of folk democracy
paved the way for the spread of democracy in Serbian society in the nineteenth century. Finally,
Serbian intelligentsia dedicated itself as a group to the modernization of the Serbian political
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state which resulted in the development of the rule of law and constitutionalism along with the
institutionalization of political processes and practices.76
Constitutionalism Post-Independence
After Serbia's independence in 1878 the Radical Party, the Obrenović monarchy along
with the Liberal and Progressive Parties, and the Great Powers participated in a tug of war over
power in Serbian politics. Relying on the Serbian rural folk for political support, the Radicals
sought to please the Serbian peasantry by giving them certain rights in Serbia's Constitutions that
would better their social and economic position in Serbian society. On the other side, the
Liberals and Progressives aimed to disempower the rural folk because they feared the peasants'
numerosity in Serbian society, despite their mutual commitment to advance the civil rights and
freedoms of all Serbs. Finally, Austria-Hungary and Russia both wished to remain influential in
Serbia and in the region at large. Most characteristic of this era of Serbian constitutionalism is
the competing ideological interests between socialist ideals, as promoted by the Radicals and
supported by Serbia's most numerous social group, and the ensuing capitalism of the period that
Austria-Hungary and other western European states promoted, largely for their own benefit.
As the majority party in Serbian government, the Radicals passed the Constitution of
1888 after criticizing the Constitution of 1869 for its lack of clarity on individual rights and
freedoms. Like the Constitution of 1869, the Constitution of 1888 was drafted under the
influence of Western European ideas and political philosophies, mimicking the Belgian
Constitution. Serbia's new Constitution presented the individual rights and freedoms of Serbs in
clear and consistent language absent ambiguity or space for further interpretation. It guaranteed
Serbia's citizens the freedom of speech, as had the Constitution of 1869, an independent
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judiciary, and a clause prohibiting the suspension of the Constitution regardless of
circumstances. As with the Constitution of 1869, the importance of the Large National
Assembly as a law-generating body grew and a majority vote became necessary to pass
legislation while government representatives at the Large National Assembly now enjoyed the
right to overrule the monarch's political decisions by a majority vote. In addition, the
Constitution of 1888 allocated more power to local self-government thereby vesting the Serbian
rural population with more control over their position in society.
However, as with Serbia's previous Constitutions, the Constitution of 1888 discriminated
against Serbia's poor by denying them suffrage rights unless they pay a poll tax.77 Unfortunately,
like in other western European states, Serbian women were denied suffrage rights. Nonetheless,
despite the apparent setbacks of the Constitution of 1888, this Constitution guaranteed Serbia's
citizens considerable freedoms, frightening the Great Powers, particularly Austria-Hungary, that
its own subjects would seek similar freedoms.
Austria-Hungary greatly disapproved of the Constitution of 1888 because it threatened
the rule of King Milan, whose decisions could now be overruled by the majority Radicals in the
Large National Assembly, and the little power that the Liberals and Progressives had. AustriaHungary promoted its interests in Serbia through Milan, Liberals and the Progressives and
perceived as a threat the increasing powers of the Serbian rural folk, and as a result exerted
pressure on the Radicals to pass a new Constitution that would diminish the rights of Serbia's
rural population.
Shortly after members of the Radical Party in the Large National Assembly passed the
Constitution of 1894, as per the demands of Austria-Hungary, Russia demanded the reenactment
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of the 1888 Constitution. Russia saw the Constitution of 1894 as a furtherance of AustriaHungary's interests in Serbia. While the Constitution of 1894 promoted Austria-Hungary's
economic interests as a growing capitalist power, the Constitution of 1888 nationalized Serbia's
industries, primarily salt and tobacco, and prevented the Great Powers from investing in them.
Although Russia's monarchy denounced socialist ideals, it supported the Radical Party because
of its anti-Austrian position.
Due to Russian pressure, the Serbian King Aleksandar Obrenović promulgated the
Constitution of 1901 but tailored it to appease Austria-Hungary. The Constitution of 1901
lacked the enumerated individual rights and freedoms of the Constitution of 1888 but instead
made them subject to legislation by the Large National Assembly and the Senate. It introduced a
bi-cameral legislative form of government that consisted of the Large National Assembly, which
had 130 representatives, and a Senate with 51 representatives of which three-fifths King
Aleksandar was to elect.
The Radicals, representing the Serbian rural population but also the Serbian Army,
strongly opposed the Constitution of 1901 and demanded that a new, more liberal constitution be
brought. In 1903, the Serbian army assassinated King Aleksandar and his wife Draga Mašin
which brought an end to the Obrenović dynasty and the overwhelming influence of AustriaHungary over the Serbs. The Radical Party installed the Karadjordjević dynasty and ratified the
Constitution of 1903, enumerating similar rights and freedoms as those presented in the 1888
Constitution. To ensure the protection of rights and freedoms of Serbia's citizens, the Radicals
mandated the formation of a Council of State and independent judiciary.
Constitutionalism in post-independence Serbia demonstrates the evolvement of Western
European ideas and philosophies on individual rights and freedoms in Serbian society and the
growing tension between Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire in international affairs. After
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experiencing the protection that individual rights and freedoms gave to the Serbian rural
population, the peasantry became adamant about retaining these rights. Interestingly, despite the
Serbs acceptance of the idea of individual rights, Serbian political culture remained communal,
for the most part, allowing for easy integration into the Yugoslav communist framework in
second half of the twentieth century.
Foreign Relations: A Determining Factor
Since Garašanin's "Načertanije" central to Serbia's foreign policy was the idea that Serbia
expand its territory westward so that it could establish an outlet to the Adriatic Sea and thereby
increase its economic and military power in order to deter the Great Powers from exerting their
influence in the region by interfering in Serbia's affairs. An economically and militarily
powerful Serbia would be able to deter Austria-Hungary from enlarging its territory at the
expense of independent Serbia and the decaying Ottoman Empire, and to prevent Russia from
attempting further to include Serbia in its sphere of influence. Moreover, a strong Serbian
military would be able to defeat the remaining Ottoman forces in the Balkans and thereby enable
Serbian expansion westward, southward, and southwestward into Old Serbia and finally Kosovo.
However, in 1878 with the Treaty of Berlin, Serbia's aspiration of westward expansion
were crushed when Austria-Hungary negotiated with the other Great Powers that it receive the
right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, territory that had been under the control
of the Porte since 1463. Although the Treaty of Berlin recognized Serbia's independence from
the Ottoman Empire by making Serbia a de jure independent state, the Treaty indirectly
prohibited Serbia from westward expansion by giving Bosnia and Herzegovina to AustriaHungary. With the Treaty of Berlin, Serbian political philosophers and the government realized
that Serbia would need to compete with Austria-Hungary and Russia for power in the region.
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Restrained by Austria-Hungary, Serbia developed friendly relations with Russia. In the
early twentieth century the Radicals government and the Karadjordjević monarchy determined
that partnership with Russia would assist the Serbs in southward and southwestward expansion
which have the effect of not only increasing Serbia's territory but also deterring Austria-Hungary
from exerting its influence on Serbia. Russia would benefit from its partnership with Serbia
since it could then more easily spread its influence in the region.
Serbia's collaboration with Russia in the area of foreign policy led Austria-Hungary to
adopt an increasingly imperious posture in relation to Serbia which resulted in the acceleration of
anti-Austrian sentiment among the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and eventually the onset of
World War I with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the Austrian Empire.
Austria-Hungary knowingly obstructed Serbia's foreign policy interest of westward
expansion and sought to deter the Serbian state from forming an alliance with Russia in order to
promote its foreign policy objectives. In its aim to prevent Serbia from collaborating with Russia
Austria-Hungary granted Milan Obrenović title of King of Serbia and signed with him the
"Secret Convention" which stipulated that Austria-Hungary would support Serbia's expansion
southward at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, with the exception of the Sandzak of Novi
Pazar that was to remain in Austria-Hungary's sphere of influence, while Serbia would abstain
from organizing and/or supporting any political or religious uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Sandzak of Novi Pazar that were to be directed against Austria-Hungary.78 AustriaHungary considered the Sandzak of Novi Pazar, a strip of land that connects Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the north with Kosovo and Metohija in the south and Serbia in the east with
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Montenegro in the west, as strategically important to its foreign policy interests in the region
which included containing Serbia's westward expansion.
In 1881, Serbia and Austria-Hungary signed the "Trade Treaty of 1881" which bound
Serbia to an agreement that limited its profits on most of its exports to Austria-Hungary as a
trading partner. The "Trade Treaty" stipulated that Serbia export its pigs, cattle, hides, and
agricultural products to Austria-Hungary at lower tariff rates than was standard in nineteenth
century circumstances while Austria-Hungary exported manufactured goods to Serbia.79 Like
the "Secret Convention", the "Trade Treaty" was negotiated by Austrophile Milan. The Radicals
denounced the "Trade Treaty" and argued that Austria-Hungary's intended through the Treaty to
deter Serbia from developing its industrial sector, which in this period represented a sector of the
economy characteristic of western European modern states and which would have promoted
Serbia's economic development.
In 1903, after the coup d'etat in Serbia, the pro-Russian Serbian government under the
Radicals and the Karadjordjević monarchy overtly shifted its foreign policy towards Russia.
After the "Trade Treaty" of 1881, the Radicals worked to liberate Serbia from Austria-Hungary's
influence on Serbia's economic development and the growth of the Serbian military.80
Disapproving of Serbia's increasingly cordial relations with Russia, Austria-Hungary declared a
tariff war on Serbia in 1906.81 Subsequently, in 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and
Herzegovina to the Empire and built a railroad in the Sandzak of Novi Pazar that formally
separated Serbia and Montenegro in order to prevent Serbia from establishing an outlet to the
Adriatic Sea via its unification with Montenegro.82
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Austria-Hungary's increasingly aggressive posturing towards Serbia led Serbia to pursue
further its strategy of expansion southwestward into Old Serbia and southward onto present day
northern Macedonia. Since the 1860s with Serbia's national revival, Serbia maintained that Old
Serbia was de facto Serbian land because it was inhabited by a population who spoke Štokavian,
practiced the Serbian Eastern Orthodox faith, and shared the same customs as Serbs in the
motherland.83
As of 1878 Serbia's foreign policy interests included southward expansion onto present
day northern Macedonia as well. Moreover, Serbia used the same factors in demonstrating
territorial ownership rights on the basis of self-determination of northern Macedonia as with Old
Serbia, except adding that northern Macedonia was abundant in Serbian Orthodox monasteries
which further proved that the territory belonged to the Serbs prior to Ottoman invasion. In the
early twentieth century, Serbia established schools in the region, with Bulgaria following suit in
eastern Macedonia, and provided financial resources for the organization of guerrilla factions to
spread Serbian national identity among the population.
Serbia also lobbied to deter Russia from including northern Macedonia in its sphere of
influence. In 1904 Serbia signed with Bulgaria, which was under the influence of Russia, two
separate treaties wherein the two states promised to honor each other's sphere of interest in the
region. Austria-Hungary responded to the treaties between Serbia and Bulgaria with a tariff war
against Serbia two years later. Despite devastating economic pressure from Austria-Hungary,
Serbia remained committed to its territorial goals in Old Serbia and northern Macedonia and a
loyal partner to Russia vis-à-vis Bulgaria.
In 1912 Serbia and Bulgaria signed another treaty stipulating that the two states would
defend each other in the event that a foreign power attempt to annex, occupy, or even
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temporarily to invade with its armies any territory held under Ottoman control. A secret annex
to the treaty maintained that the liberated territories would be divided into the Serbian zone, the
Bulgarian zone, and a contested zone, which was within the intermediate regions of Macedonia,
once Serbia and Bulgaria cleared the land from the Ottoman forces.84 The Serbian zone
consisted of Old Serbia, the Sandzak of Novi Pazar, and areas north and west of the Šar
mountain range. When Austria-Hungary learned of the secret annex, it responded by denouncing
the treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria and arguing that the secret annex threatened its interests
in the Balkans, in particular the Sandzak of Novi Pazar.85 Serbia's and Austria-Hungary's
foreign policy interests continued to clash creating a great deal of tension between Serbia,
Austria-Hungary, and Russia, and setting the stage for World War I.
Russia promoted its foreign policy interests by supporting the territorial expansions of
Serbia and Bulgaria at the expense of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. In 1912 Russia supported
the establishment of the Balkan League, a loose military alliance formed among Serbia,
Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece with the objective of liberating the remaining Balkan lands
from the Ottoman forces.86 Austria-Hungary, but also France and Britain, perceived the Balkan
League as an instrument of Russian power, which in deed it was, since it was established to
promote Russian interests in the Balkans and counter those of Austria-Hungary. By the end of
1912 the Balkan League victoriously liberated a large amount of land from the Ottoman forces.87
The Treaty of London in 1913 ended the First Balkan War and thereby changed the
geopolitical landscape of the Balkans. In the making of the Treaty of London, Austria-Hungary,
along with England and France, sought to contain Russian interest in the region while advancing
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their own interests. In the negotiation of the Treaty of London, Austria-Hungary remained intent
on containing Serbia and, as a result, lobbied for the establishment of an independent Albania,
despite ongoing Ottoman presence, that would receive a greater part of Old Serbia and
Macedonia, including Peć, Prizren, Djakovica, Debar, Ohrid and Struga.88 Austria-Hungary
sought to share its sphere of influence over Albania with that of Italy. Thanks to Russian
pressure, Serbia received some of Old Serbia, however, excluding present day Kosovo and
Metohija.89
Despite Serbia's acquisition of a part of Old Serbia, the Serbian government argued that it
remained vital to Serbia's economic interests that Serbia establish an outlet to the sea.
Furthermore, Serbia argued that if the great powers refused to award Serbia an outlet to the sea,
that Serbia would have to establish one itself.90 Serbia maintained that it had abstained from its
territorial ambitions in Albania because of Austria-Hungary and that because of this territorial
sacrifice Serbia ought to be awarded an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea via Salonica. Serbia's
assertions to Salonica threatened Bulgaria that Serbia conspired to acquire its territorial
ambitions in eastern Macedonia. As a result, Bulgaria attacked Serbia, Greece, and Romania in
the Second Balkan War, however, only to be quickly defeated by a far greater alliance of Serbs
and Greeks, and Romanians and Ottoman forces. The Second Balkan War ended in 1913 with
the Treaty of Bucharest. As a result of Serbia's war efforts in the Second Balkan War, Serbia
gained one half of the Sandzak of Novi Pazar, all of Old Serbia- Kosovo and Metohija, and
northern and central Macedonia.91 Serbia's territory increased from 18,650 square miles to
33,891 square miles. As per Austria-Hungary, the Empire lost the Sandzak of Novi Pazar to
Serbia and Montenegro which cut Austria-Hungary off geographically from Albania and thereby
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devastated it geopolitical strategy in the region. With Serbia's acquisition of Old Serbia, Kosovo
and a part of present-day Macedonia, Serbia became a regional hegemon, a circumstance that
severely embarrassed and threatened Austria-Hungary.92

Yugoslavism
Yugoslavism provided the ideological underpinning for the formation of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and later the Communist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. It
originated from the merging of ideas of Illyrianism, a nineteenth century Croatian political
movement, and pan-Slavism, a mid-nineteenth century Russian socio-political movement
embraced by twentieth century Serbian intellectuals. Yugoslav ideology rested on the idea that
the Great Powers would cease to exert their political and economic influence on the South Slavs
if the South Slavs formed a political state on the basis of their common South Slav language,
despite differences in dialect, and shared customs.
Illyrianism originated in the 1830s as a political movement by a group of Croatian
intellectuals, most notably Ljudovit Gaj, who argued that the growing influence of the Magyar
culture in the Croat Banovina of Austria-Hungary ought to be countered by aggrandizing
Croatian national culture. These two political philosophers believed that the Croats could better
resist Magyar culture by learning that they belonged to the South Slav nation, who were really
Illyrians, and integrating into the Croatian state in Austria-Hungary under one common Croatian
language.93 Furthermore, the Croatian nation included all Croats in Austria-Hungary despite the
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fact that they spoke three different dialects- Štokavian, Kajkavian, and Čakavian.94 The
Illyrianists argued that Štokavian ought to become the national language of the Croats because it
was spoken by the majority of South Slavs outside of Austria-Hungary, a fact that would enable
the easier unification of the Croats and the other South Slavs.95
Since Illyrianism relied on the ideas of Croatian national revival the most Serbs in Serbia
proper and some Serbs in Austria-Hungary rejected Illyrianism since they already had a welldeveloped national identity as a result of the Serbian Orthodox Church acting as protector of
Serbian cultural identity during the era of Ottoman rule over the Serbs.
In the 1860s Illyrianism became Yugoslavism when it underwent a modified revival by
Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Canon Franjo Rački. Like Illyrianism, central to Yugoslav ideology
was the idea that in order for the Croats to resist Austria-Hungary's denationalization efforts the
Croats would need the political, economic and moral support of Serbs in Serbia proper and
within the Austria-Hungarian Empire. Furthermore, Strossmayer and Rački argued that the
South Slavs ought to unite under the umbrella of a common South Slav language and culture to
form a political unit within Austria-Hungary.96 However, unlike the Ilyrianists the Yugoslavs
stressed that the Croats had legitimate territorial claims to the western Balkans, precisely from
the Bojana River in the south to the Drina and Danube Rivers in the north, and thereby refused to
acknowledge the fact that the Serbs who lived in lands still occupied by the Ottoman Empire and
Austria-Hungary had a right to national self-determination.97 Strossmayer and Rački, in their
capacities as political philosophers, denied the Serbs in Austria-Hungary the right to national
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self-determination and argued that the former had a moral obligation to assist the Croats in their
national struggle against Magyar supremacy and German centralization.98
Most Serbs in Austria-Hungary rejected Yugoslavism because they perceived it as a
Croatian national movement with the goal of forming a Croatian political state within AustriaHungary. The Serbs already had well-developed sense of national identity due to the activities of
the Serbian Orthodox Church, as mentioned in Chapter 2. The Serbs in Austria-Hungary began
to support Yugoslavism only in 1903 with the formation of the Croato-Serb Coalition.99
Ideologically competing with Illyrianism, and later Yugoslavism, the radical Croatian
nationalist movement emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century. The movement's
standard-bearers were Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik. and they argued that due to AustriaHungary the Croatian nation was in danger of disappearing and that the only solution to
preserving Croatian national sentiment was the creation of a "Great Croatia" that would extend
from the Alps to the Drina River and from Albania to the Danube River. 100 Starčević and
Kvaternik believed that all South Slavs who lived within these territories ought to become Croat
nationalized, and recognized only the Croats and Bulgarians as belonging to a national race.101
They argued that the Serbs were an "unclean race of various origins, dating to ancient times,
which was bound together only by its servile nature" and that the Serbs in Austria-Hungary were
not ethnic Serbs but Croats.102
Pan-Slavism originated as early as the sixteenth century with Croatian philosopher Vinko
Pribojević however only to gain widespread significance only in the mid-nineteenth century
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when embraced by Russian intellectuals to promote Russia's foreign policy interests in the
Balkans (see Figure 10). Pan-Slavism emerged from the idea that all European Slavs shared a
common Slavic language and common customs which ought to unite the European Slavs
politically and spiritually under Russia. In the Balkans Russia promoted the ideas of PanSlavism to spread its influence among the South Slavs with the goal of countering the
geopolitical interests of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Slavism was more
accepted by the Serbs than the Croats most likely because the Serbs shared a common religion
and political ideology with the Russians, in the period.
The idea of forming a Yugoslav unit within Austria-Hungary became feasible only in
1903 when the Croato-Serb Coalition, under Croat Frano Supilo and Serb Svetozar Pribičević,
linked together in mainland Croatia and the Dalmatian Coast with the goal of uniting all Croats
and Serbs within a common political entity. In the early twentieth century the Serbian
government under the Radicals and Karadjordjević monarchy lacked interest in forming a
political state with the South Slavs in Austria-Hungary since any type of political unification
would have threatened further Austria-Hungary. Despite the policy of the Serbian government
towards the South Slavs in Austria-Hungary, Serbian intellectuals and youth nurtured a proYugoslav sentiment organizing cultural events in Belgrade with the South Slavs in AustriaHungary and transforming Belgrade into the cultural piedmont of the South Slavs. Unlike
Serbia's intellectuals and youth, the Serbian rural population remained disinterested in ideas
about Serbian kinship with the Croatians and other South Slavs because it nurtured local loyalties
and interests. By 1914 the idea of forming a Yugoslav unit within Austria-Hungary became dead
and the establishment of an independent South Slav political state appeared to be the only viable
solution to ensure political independence for the South Slavs.
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During World War I the Serbian military fought under the banner of Yugoslavism to
liberate the remaining South Slavs, principally the Croats, from Austria-Hungary's rule and to
enable the unification of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in an independent Yugoslav political
state.103 In July 1917 it was stipulated in the Corfu Declaration that the Yugoslav state be named
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and that it be a constitutional, democratic
parliamentary monarchy with the Karadjordjević dynasty as the ruling house. Nikola Pašić,
Serbian Prime Minister, and Ante Trumbić, president of the Yugoslav Committee, both signed
the Corfu Declaration.104
During the short life of the Kingdom, from 1918 until 1939, a constant tension existed
between the Serbian and Croatian governments on the level of federalism that ought to exist
within the state framework. While the Croats argued that the level of federalism ought to be
decreased principally out of fear that they would never be able to promote their national interests
because of the Serbian majority population in the Kingdom, the Serbs argued that decreasing the
level of federalism in the state political structure would cause political instability because of the
numerous national minorities that lived in the Kingdom. The Serbs feared that less federalism
would divide the Serbian majority population into several different federal units, since the Serbs
were populated throughout the entire Kingdom, which would lead to a loss of political
representation for the Serb minorities in the Kingdom.
Constant tension between the Serbs and Croats, but also the Slovenes, resulted in the
collapse of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the early days of World War II.
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Serbian and Croatian politicians in the Kingdom were unable to strike a balance between the
appropriate level of federalism and decentralism due to the complexity of how the South Slavs
were situated within the Western Balkans as a result of predominantly Ottoman but also Austrian
occupation. Nonetheless, despite the failure of Yugoslavism as an ideology to promote nation
blindness in the Kingdom, Yugoslavism again provided the ideological underpinning for the
formation of the Communist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945.

Conclusion
Post-independence Serbia underwent a period of intense political change in the late
nineteenth century during which the Serbian rural population transformed the underlying
political system from one that was patriarchal and elite-based to a socialist-populist system that
rested on the ideas of communalism and egalitarianism. As stated in Chapter Two, the zadruga
social structure played a significant role in shaping Serbian political culture in that its internal
organization promoted communal and egalitarian values. Inspired by "narodism", Svetozar
Marković introduced populist ideology to Serbian intellectuals after which populist-socialist, but
also Marxist, ideas trickled down to the Serbian rural folk. The Radical Party tapped into
Serbian political culture and used symbolism to present socialist-populist ideology to the Serbian
peasantry, which the peasantry accepted and widely supported.
The relationship between Serbia and the Great Powers, namely Russia and AustriaHungary, shaped post-independence Serbian constitutionalism. Both the Russian and AustriaHungarian Empires sought an active role in the drafting of Serbia's constitutions, despite Serbia’s
status as a de jure independent state, in order to promote their interests in the region and as a
result influenced the level of rights and freedoms that were to be given to the Serbs.
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Serbia's plan of westward expansion, that would enable the state to obtain an outlet to the
Adriatic Sea, was hindered by Austria-Hungary which received rights to occupy Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1878 and to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 while it sturdily held on to
the Sandzak of Novi Pazar to prevent Serbia from joining a common union with Montenegro and
establishing an outlet to the Adriatic Sea . Since Serbia could not expand westward it began
expanding southward and southwestward at the expense of former Ottoman territories. Serbia
turned to Russia for support and protection from Austria-Hungary. Its territory almost doubled
after the Balkan Wars.
The early twentieth century represents the birth of Yugoslavism, a pan-South Slav
political movement that originated from the ideas of Illyrianism and Pan-Slavism. Yugoslavism
served as the founding ideology for the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1917 and the
Communist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945
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CHAPTER FIVE:
YUGOSLAVISM
Introduction
In this Chapter I examine the ideological underpinnings of the Yugoslav communist
system to shed light on the causes behind the collapse of Yugoslavia. Despite the failures of
Yugoslavism to unite ideologically the South Slavs in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes, many South Slavs fought together during World War II under the banner of
Yugoslavism to liberate the Balkans from the fascist powers (see Figures 10 and 11). The
ultimate goal was the establishment of a Yugoslav communist state. Perhaps under the influence
of the political and ideological challenges of the Kingdom, the CPY installed an array of
different policies and programs aimed at eliminating the national and cultural differences among
the South Slavs and promoting Yugoslavism. Ideas of brotherhood and unity, workers' selfmanagement, and international non-alignment all served to promote Yugoslavism. The Serbs
readily accepted communism perhaps due to the communal and egalitarian nature of Serbian
political culture since the Battle of Kosovo.
However, while the Serbs in Serbia proper largely approved of the Yugoslav communist
political and state framework, in the early 1960s Croats and Slovenes began to lobby against it.
They claimed that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia sabotaged their own national interests,
which doctrinally were prohibited from existing, due to the Serb majority in the Yugoslav state.
Croats and Slovenes proposed that the Yugoslav state be decentralized. In 1963 Yugoslavia
decentralized resulting with the various nationalities, or ethnicities albeit, being represented by
the Republic in which they resided and no longer by the national group that they belonged to.
While this new set-up strengthened the political position of the Croats and Slovenes, it politically
hurt the Serbs who were scattered throughout the Yugoslav Republics and were minorities in
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each Republic except for Serbia. Still dissatisfied, Croats and Slovenes pushed for further
decentralization. In 1974 the Communist Party of Yugoslavia divided the Republic of Serbia
into three separate political entities, the Republic of Serbia became Serbia, the Autonomous
Province of Kosovo and Metohija, and the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. The two new
Autonomous Provinces received the right to succeed from the Republic, resulting in another
political loss for the Serbs.
With new transparency laws in the late 1970s, Serbian intellectuals became increasingly
vocal about the gradually weakening position of the Serbs within the Yugoslav state framework.
Nonetheless, despite the apparent anti-Serb policies of the Yugoslav communist party, most
Serbs remained loyal Yugoslavs.

"Brotherhood and Unity" and Paternalism
Central to Yugoslavism was the idea of "brotherhood and unity" which had originated
with the South Slav youth in Austria-Hungary, as described in Chapter Four. After World War II
many South Slavs, in particular those who suffered under the genocide of the Croat Ustaša
regime, remained divided on national grounds. To unite ideologically the South Slavs in
Yugoslavia the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) promoted the idea of "brotherhood and
unity". The Yugoslav state framework embodied the very idea of “brotherhood and unity” in
that the single Yugoslav federal unit of government represented the "unity" aspect of the slogan
while the six, and later eight after the 1974 decentralization process, republic level units signified
the "brotherhood" factor.
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"Nation blindness" represented one of the main features of "brotherhood and unity". It
promoted a collective Yugoslav national identity while also recognizing the various different
nationalities that existed within the federal state.105
The CPY incorporated the idea of "brotherhood and unity" into the Yugoslav framework
largely by promoting the principles of "brotherhood and unity" in the Yugoslav educational
system. Moreover, the CPY featured the "brotherhood and unity" theme in educational
textbooks and promoted it in school activities, such as in plays and through class excursions
throughout Yugoslavia. For example, CPY created a Yugoslav student exchange program that
encouraged elementary school students to visit throughout the different Yugoslav republics. In
the name of "brotherhood and unity", the CPY formed sister schools to promote cross-national
bonding. Despite the erosion of federalism with the decentralization processes, CPY continued
to promote the idea of "brotherhood and unity" in the Yugoslav educational system
indoctrinating the South Slav youth with the ideals of Yugoslavism.
The Yugoslav communist system survived so long in South Slav society in part because
the CPY relied on paternalism to maintain their legitimacy among the South Slavs. After living
under either the Ottoman Empire or the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, most South Slavs grew
accustomed to the paternalism of these Great Powers, which includes the Serbs despite their brief
encounter with socialist-populist ideology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
To gain legitimacy, CPY leaders tapped into the political culture of the South Slavs, presenting
its leadership as the only viable political solution to the Yugoslav state. As discussed earlier, the
CPY easily gained legitimacy among the Serbian rural population due to the pre-existing
patriarchy in Serbian political culture.106
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The CPY relied on paternalism to promote Yugoslavism vis-à-vis the Yugoslav
educational system. In 1942 the already active CPY established the Union of Pioneers of
Yugoslavia after the Young Pioneer Organization of the Soviet Union to indoctrinate Yugoslav
youth with principles of "brotherhood and unity" with Tito as the father of the homeland.
Yugoslav children became Tito's Pioneers at the age of seven on the first day of elementary
school when they took the following official oath:
Today, as I become a Pioneer,
I give my Pioneer's word of honorthat I will study and work tirelessly,
respect my parents and elders,
and be a loyal and honest comrade.
That I will love our homeland the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia under
workers self-management.
That I will spread brotherhood and unity,
and the ideas for which comrade Tito fought.
And that I will value all peoples of the world who respect freedom and peace!107
After taking the oath, the children received a blue "Titovka" hat, or "Tito's Hat", with a red metal
star brooch and a red handkerchief signifying the colors of the Yugoslav flag and marking their
initiation into the Union of Pioneers of Yugoslavia.
Unlike the paternalism of "brotherhood and unity", the program of workers selfmanagement rested on communal values since it conferred decision-making power to each
Yugoslav industrial worker. Workers self-management emerged in 1948 after the Tito-Stalin
split as part of CPY's effort to differentiate Yugoslav from Soviet communist ideology by
transferring power from the federal level to the local level and giving Yugoslav workers enough
control over their activities of their respective firms. Tito believed that while workers selfmanagement chipped away at the political framework of the Yugoslav state it also strengthened
Yugoslavism to the degree that Yugoslav ideology would continue to exist even with the
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dissolution of Yugoslavia (see Figure 12).108 The system of workers self-management rested on
the slogan of "factories to workers" and widely appealed to Serbia's rural folk because it
promoted communal and egalitarian values.109 However, workers self-management also
influenced the Serbian rural population to believe that democracy was the unchallenged rule of
the majority class.110
Learning from the experiences of the South Slavs while under the occupations of the
Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary, CPY based Yugoslav foreign policy on the principle of
remaining non-aligned in relation to the US and the USSR during the cold war. Tito believed
that the South Slavs could avoid their legacies of foreign domination only by pursuing a more or
less politically neutral foreign policy. Although the South Slavs remained free of foreign
influence well into the mid-1980s, they were subject to communist ideology and indoctrination.

Decentralization
Decentralization destabilized the Yugoslav political framework. In the late 1950s the
Croats and Slovenes began to advocate that the Yugoslav political system ought to become less
centralized so that each Yugoslav Republic could receive more power to control its internal
affairs. In 1963 the Yugoslav federal structure underwent the process of decentralization
whereby Yugoslavia's various nationalities, or ethnicities albeit, no longer received
representation according to their national group but in accordance with the Republic in which
they resided. The decentralization process of 1963 most affected the Serbs who resided as
minorities in all six Republics and as a result lost the opportunity to be represented by the
Republic of Serbia but by the government of the Republic where they resided. Due to the
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undemocratic nature of the communist system, Serb minorities often lacked representation.
Serbs in the Republic of Croatia suffered most from the new political system due to the lingering
anti-Serb sentiment among many Croats, particularly those involved in Ustasha war activities
during World War II.111 Most vocal of anti-decentralization CPY members was Aleksandar
Ranković who argued that decentralization threatened Yugoslavism as the state's underlying
ideology because it destabilized the position of the Serbs as the state's largest national group.
The Croats, on the other hand, saw the Yugoslav federalist structure as an effort by the
Serbs to keep the Croatian nation hostage due to the large Serbian minority in the Krajina region
of the Republic of Croatia.112 Also Croat and Slovene CPY leaders feared Serbian hegemony in
Yugoslavia due to the Serbs being the largest national group in Yugoslavia. In addition these
actors believed that decentralization would allow their respective Republics to transform their
economies from workers self-management to capitalist free market.113
The decentralization process of 1974 further decreased the power of the Serbs in
Yugoslavia. In 1974 the CPY revised the pre-existing Constitution giving the Autonomous
Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo almost identical political powers as the Republics enjoyed
and further fragmented the Serbs as a political group.114 In the late 1970s Serbian intellectuals
posed an array of philosophical questions regarding the decentralization processes such as, why
the CPY denied autonomy to the minority Serb population in the Krajina region of the Republic
of Croatia but granted it to Vojvodina which was inhabited largely by Serb nationals; and, also,
why the CPY declined to give autonomy to the large Albanian minorities in the Republics of
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Macedonia and Montenegro but granted it to the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija. These
questions can be answered in a multitude of ways, however, perhaps the most compelling answer
being that the Croats and Slovenes feared Serb hegemony within Yugoslavia due to the size of
the Serbian state after 1945, the large number of the Serbs who were scattered throughout six
different Republics, and the very fact that the Serbs were the first to gain national independence
and to free the Croats and other South Slavs from Austria-Hungary which gave the Serbs a sense
of increased pride.

The Serbian Intelligentsia
In the late 1970s Serbian intelligentsia established numerous theories as to why the CPY
diminished the power of the Serbs as a national group in Yugoslavia. Members of the Serbian
intelligentsia argued that while the Croats unfairly accused the Serbs of centralism and unitarism
they overlooked the fact that centralism in fact had been implanted after the war ‘in order to
prevent the raising of the question of national responsibilities for the genocide that had been
carried out against the Serbs' during World War II”.115 The idea of a communist Yugoslav state
emerged before World War II had ended and the CPY never condemned the crimes of the Ustaša
in explicitly national terms. Furthermore, the Serbian intellectuals argued that the CPY's lack of
action in condemning the Croats for their activities against the Serbs, Jews, and Roma absolved
them from forming a collective guilt for their crimes.116 Moreover, the intellectuals further
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claimed that the Croats planned to create an independent national state immediately after World
War II that would be exclusively for Croats, as was represented in the drafted constitution for the
planned state.
After Tito's death in 1981 the Serbian intellectuals lamented on how the CPY's federal
policies under Tito ruined the position of the Serbs in Yugoslavia. These intellectuals concluded
that beginning with the very formation of the Yugoslav state Tito believed that the federal state
framework could be preserved only under the condition that the Serbs be stripped of their
political power as the most numerous national group in Yugoslavia.117 Furthermore, they argued
that the CPY failed to acknowledge the courageous efforts of the Serbs for liberating their South
Slavs brothers from Austria-Hungary's grip during World War I and for fighting under the
banner of a common Yugoslav state in great numbers in order to free the South Slavs from the
Nazis and the Ustaša regime during World War II. While the Serbians partisans played an
important role in providing a "clean slate" for the establishment of the Yugoslav state, the CPY
tailored its federal policies against the Serbs.118
Serbian intellectuals established that the Serbs were “stabbed in the back” by the CPY
and that they were the victims of the Yugoslav state and nation-building projects. This sentiment
re-introduced the ideology of victimhood that the Serbs so often nurtured under the Ottoman
Empire.
In post-Tito Yugoslavia, Kosta Čavoški, Ljubomir Tadić, and Dobrica Cosić were the
most vocal members of the anti-CPY Serbian intellectuals. These intellectuals argued that the
Yugoslav state served as a vehicle for the individual nationalities of the six Republics to become
each independent nation-states based on the theory that the Serbs were oppressing the other
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Yugoslav nationalities. 119 While each CPY member advanced the interests of his national
group, the Serbs were busy defending themselves from these allegations. The primary goal of
Yugoslavia was the creation of a multitude of individual nation-states, while communism
represented solely the means to independent statehood for these nations. Furthermore, Čavoški,
Tadić, and Cosić argued that the practice of workers self-management represented a cover-up of
"bureaucratic nationalism" which in fact did not promote Yugoslavism but destroyed it, and that
should the Serbs had expressed any opposition to "bureaucratic nationalism" they again would
have been perceived by the other Yugoslav nationalities as "hegemonic and unitarist".120
Čavoški, Tadić, and Cosić turned much of their focus to the political future of the
Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. These intellectuals stressed that the territory of
Kosovo represented the spiritual, cultural and historic heart of Serbia and the Serb nation, and
that because of this it ought to remain an integral part of Serbia and that its autonomy and that its
legal status as an autonomous Republic ought to be reversed to pre-1974.121 It was necessary
that the reintegration of Kosovo and Metohija into Serbia occur promptly in order to reverse the
effects that the multiplying birthrate of Kosovan Albanians was having on the Province. Finally,
in regards to the granting of Autonomous Province status to Kosovo and Metohija and
Vojvodina, Čavoški, Tadić, and Cosić argued that CPY policies brought Serbia's borders back to
what they were before the I and II Balkan Wars in 1912, with the exception of two provinces
formerly held by the Bulgarians, and 1913 and that, summa summarum, the Serbs were the
biggest losers of the Yugoslav project. 122
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Conclusion
Despite the failures of Yugoslavism to unite ideologically and politically the South Slavs
in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, many South Slavs fought together during
World War II under the banner of Yugoslavism. To establish, and later preserve, unity in
Yugoslavia CPY installed an array of different policies and programs aimed towards eliminating
the national and cultural difference between the South Slavs. Central to these policies and
programs was the idea of “brotherhood and unity”, as well as workers’ self-management and
intentional non-alignment. “Brotherhood and unity” served as the central idea for promoting
Yugoslavism in the Yugoslav education system. The Serbs in Serbia proper readily accepted
communism perhaps due to the communal and egalitarian nature of Serbian political culture
since the Battle of Kosovo.
The decentralization processes of 1963 and 1974 brought about the gradual
disappearance of Yugoslavism among the South Slavs. The 1963 decentralization process split
the political representation of the Serbs so that Serbian minorities received political
representation from the government in the Republic in which they resided. The 1974
decentralization process further decreased the political power of the Serbs in Yugoslavia since it
divided the Republic of Serbia into three separate political bodies and gave the two new
provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija, succession rights from Serbia proper. The two
decentralization processes destabilized the Yugoslav federal framework.
Beginning with the later 1970s Serbian intellectuals criticized CPY policies claiming that
the Party strengthened the political position of the other nationalities, particular those of the
Croats and Slovenes, while it weakened the political position of the Serbs. Nonetheless, despite
the cautionary and reactionary position of the Serbian intelligentsia most Serbs remained loyal
Yugoslavs.
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CHAPTER SIX:
SERBIA UNDER SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ
Introduction
In this Chapter I examine the impact of particular events and institutions in Serbian
society that swayed the Serbs towards the option of intense nationalism as opposed to a peaceful
journey of national revival in the post-communist period. In addition, I analyze the role of the
United States in shaping Serbian political reality in the 1990s and bringing about the demise of
Slobodan Milošević and his regime.
In the late 1980s Milošević tapped into the political culture of the Serbs and reawakened
patriarchal values in Serbian society in order to gain political support. He took advantage of the
demise of communist values and the existing ideological power vacuum in Serbian society and
introduced a modern version of the myth of the Battle of Kosovo to the Serbs. Moreover,
Milošević revived the old fear, and reality, of Kosovo being “lost” and the martyrdom that came
along with the Serbian national myth. Milošević took advantage of the Serbs' growing distrust
towards the other Yugoslav nations as Yugoslavia was on the brink of collapse. Instead of
undergoing a process of peaceful post-communist national revival, the Serbs under Milošević
experienced more than a decade of intense religious nationalism.
After the United States perceived the collapse of Yugoslavia as a threat to the fragile
stability of Eastern Europe it intervened in the Balkans. Since the early 1990s the United States
initiated a campaign targeted to remove the Milošević regime from power and to promote the
democratization of Serbian society. Moreover it pumped large sums of money into the bank
accounts of Serbia's political opposition parties and non-for-profit organizations. The most

77

financial and technical support went to Otpor, which began as a small student-led movement but
became the moving force of Serbia's opposition movement.

Milošević Nationalism: Patriarchy Revisited
Milošević gained political legitimacy in Serbian society by tapping into the patriarchal
but also communal elements of Serbian political culture. In the late 1980s Milošević advocated
that Yugoslavia remain a unitary, federal state. For example, in a speech given in 1988 during a
"Brotherhood and Unity" rally in Belgrade Milošević stressed that the Yugoslav federal structure
ought to be preserved and to accomplish this the South Slavs ought to commit their energies to
defending Yugoslavism from anti-Yugoslav forces, as done by Tito with the communist
revolution.123 Despite the gradually spreading collective national sentiment of victimology due
to the perceived injustices of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) under the communist
regime, Milošević knew that the majority of Serbs still supported Yugoslavism and an integral
Yugoslavia, primarily because of Serbian political culture.
Nonetheless, Milošević realized that in order to stay in power he would need to tap into
the patriarchal aspect of Serbian political culture to reawaken the collective memories of the
Battle of Kosovo and the Serbian national myth. In a paternalistic tone, Milošević argued that
the Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija, but also Vojvodina, ought to be politically
reintegrated into the Republic of Serbia. Milošević tapped into the political culture of the
Kosovan Serb population, now a marginalized minority in the Province, and in April 1987 he
addressed a crowd of frightened Kosovan Serbs with "No one shall dare beat you." after a
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number of Serbs complained that the Kosovan Albanians were beating.124 Milošević's
paternalism signaled the beginning of a tidal wave of nationalism in Serbia.
Milošević was aware that arousing Serbian national sentiment over the possible "loss" of
Kosovo would re-awaken Serbian claims to the region. As Čolović argues in The Politics of
Identity in Serbia, Milošević tapped into the concept of Serbian "mythological genetics", which
is based on the idea that the talents and qualities of Serbia's medieval warriors were transferred
from one generation to another.125 "Mythological genetics" supported the idea that the Serbian
national myth of the Battle of Kosovo flowed in the blood of every Serb. As a result Serbian
national claims to Kosovo and Metohija stemmed not only from Serbian political culture but also
from genetic predeterminism.126
As I mentioned in Chapter Two, Milošević tapped into the warrior-like qualities of Serbs
during his speech on Vidovdan at Gazimestan where he stated that the Serbs may resort to arms
if they are unable to "reclaim" their collective property right to Kosovo by engaging in an
economic, political, social and cultural battle. Interestingly Milošević received the support of
both the Serbian intelligentsia, perhaps due to the Serbs sour experience decades ago under
communism, and the Serbian rural population in his position on Kosovo and Metohija.127
Milošević relied on paternalism to stay in power. Paternalism sprang from patriarchy, a
value deeply embedded in Serbian political culture, and the Serbian rural folk had become
accustomed to being led by their nation's pater, as they were in the semi-independent Serbian
state and later under the communist regime. To win the support of the Serbian rural population,
Milošević used the Serbian peasant as an example of the "ideal Serb". He argued that the "ideal
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Serb" was an honest, hard-working man who refrained from questioning political authority and
minded his own business. This type of paternalistic mindset also surfaced in communist
Yugoslavia when an old man once commented on how he was just a worker and how he was
disinterested in the political process because he trusted his nation's political leader to make the
correct decisions without his input.128
According to Eric Gordy in The Culture of Power in Serbia, Milošević stayed in power
for such a lengthy period precisely because he destroyed all viable political and cultural
alternatives to his regime.129 Milošević's paternalism assured Serbian rural folk that his regime
was the only viable regime for Serbia and discouraged the existence of any political parties who
would oppose his leadership.
Nonetheless, Milošević's paternalism towards the Serbs, following forty-five years of a
one-party political system, along with the Yugoslav Wars that many Serbs were dragged into and
the subsequent sanctions that were imposed by the various international actors, precisely made
the Serbs believe that no alternative existed to their political reality.
Foreign Relations and Communalism: the United States, Otpor, and Serbia
Since the early 1990's until Milošević's fall in 2000 United States' foreign policy under
the Bush and Clinton Administrations called for the displacement of the Milošević regime and
the building of democracy in Serbia. Until the late 1990s the United States promoted it foreign
policy in Serbia via legal international instruments and mechanisms, such as political and
economic sanctions, by putting pressure on the Milošević regime to democratize Serbian society.
As early as July 1990 Milošević yielded to a degree to pressure exerted by the United States and
enacted the "Act on Association of Citizens in Associations, Social Organizations and Political
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Parties” giving Serbia's citizens the right to form and associate freely with political parties and
non-governmental organizations. Legislation allowing media pluralism followed shortly
afterwards.130 Despite the attempts of the Milošević regime to seal off Serbian society from the
political effects of globalization, Serbs became informed on the post-communist movements in
other Eastern European states and educated about the political and economic alternatives that
Serbia's opposition parties offered leading them gradually to support the opposition parties.
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a democracy-promotion vehicle of the
United States government, actively promoted programs allowing for the democratization of
Serbian society. NED claims to be a "private, non-profit, grant-making organization that
receives an annual appropriation from U.S. Congress through the Department of State" to
promote democracy around the world.131 Since 1988 NED had been active in the former
Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia as it
provided funding and leadership for sustainable democracy building programs.132 In Serbia
NED began its activities in the early 1990s by supporting the establishment of trade unions,
independent media houses, such as radio B-92, and various non-governmental organizations,
particularly those that dealt with human rights, youth leadership, research, and cross-regional
networking. Only during the years of 1999 and 2000, NED's “democracy-building campaign” in
Serbia cost an estimated $41 million.133
NED channeled its democracy-building activities in Serbia by making the National
Democratic Institute responsible for strengthening Serbia's opposition-based political parties and
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by engaging the International Republican Institute (IRI) in the civic sector. IRI provided the
ideas and mechanisms allowing for the further growth of the student-led anti-regime grassroots
movement which began in 1988 when Serbian college students protested against proposed
government legislation to place Serbia's universities under strict government control and
supervision. Under IRI the student-led movement became known as Otpor, or resistance,
adopting a black on white, or white on black, fist as its symbol in its fight against the Milošević
regime. In the late 1990s Otpor became a multigenerational, though primarily youth-based,
organization with district offices throughout Serbia proper. It enjoyed the support of Serbia's
citizens and today receives credit as the moving force in Serbia's widespread anti-regime
movement.134
According to NED's website, Otpor received its first grant of $143,210 in 1999 “to enable
the student movement to continue organizing public events around the country by providing
material and organizational support."135 From 1999 until 2002 Otpor received more than
$825,000 of disclosed funds from NED.136 Otpor used NED funds to train its members on nonviolent resistance methods, to print and distribute leaflets with anti-Milošević regime messages,
to purchase spray paint for anti-regime graffiti writing, and finally to pay for rent and other
expenses.
Otpor relied on the communal aspect of Serbian political culture to garner support from
the public for its anti-regime activities. It organized festivities with public theatre and other
performances during which Otpor members demonstrated the injustices of the Milošević regime
and anti-regime protesters congregated in large numbers to express their general discontent with
their political reality. Otpor called on Serbs to resist the regime by collectively returning to their
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moral values. Otpor likened the Milošević regime to the backward and uncivilized nations of the
East, really alluding to the Ottoman Empire, and asked the Serbs to determine whether they
desired to live in an uncultured, primitive society that the regime promoted. To illustrate this
point, Otpor members argued that Serbian cultural identity stemmed from two different rootsone of the East, as a result of being dominated by Islamic culture for centuries, and the other of
the West, which was the Serbs "natural" medium of belonging.137 Otpor sought to demonstrate
to the Serbs that the Milošević regime promoted Serbia's Eastern heritage through its political
powerstructure and because of this was unpatriotic and treacherous towards the Serbian nation.
Like Serbia's nineteenth century intelligentsia, mentioned in Chapter Three, Otpor represented a
progressive force in Serbian politics that called for the democratization and liberalization of
Serbian society. It was aware that the communal values instilled in the Serbs generationally
would eventually surface to support a common cause as an undivided nation against a dictator.
On October 5, 2000 Slobodan Milošević fell from power after several hundred thousand
people stormed into City Hall in Belgrade demanding that he hand his presidency over to
Vojislav Koštunica, who received over fifty percent of the vote in the September 24th
presidential elections. The political overthrow of Milošević began with a strike of civil
disobedience of mine workers at Kolubara who threatened to shut down Serbia's largest power
plant unless Milošević conceded political power to Koštunica. On October 5th, several hundred
thousand Serbs from Serbia’s rural and urban areas gathered in Belgrade and stormed into
Serbia's Parliament building demanding Milošević's resignation and recognition of Koštunica as
winner of the presidential elections. Unlike previous anti-regime protests in Serbia, Milošević
failed to order a large scale police crackdown on the protestors perhaps due to his belief that the
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Yugoslav Army would turn against him. On October 7, 2000 Milošević conceded power to
Koštunica and resigned.
Conclusion
Milošević came to power in Serbia by tapping into the political culture of the Serbs at a
time when communism was in decline and national revival seemed like the logical next step.
Moreover, Milošević recognized not only the communal character of the Serbs but also the
lurking patriarchy that would enable him to use paternalism to win political support from them.
He revived the Serbian national myth, created under the Ottomans and now promoted by the
Serbian Orthodox Church, and spread nationalism in order to stay in power. After more than
four decades under the Yugoslav communist political system, the Serbs grew accustomed to not
having a political alternative to the regime in power.
The United States became politically active in the Balkans in the late 1980s after
perceiving that the collapse of the Yugoslav state would threatened the fragile stability of the
Balkans. Beginning with the early 1990s the United States the exerted a great deal of pressure
on the Milošević regime to democratize Serbian society via networks developed by the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED). NED supported the formation of Otpor, a student-led
opposition movement, to remove the Milošević regime from power. Otpor’s ideology rested on
principles of non-violent resistance and it promoted a liberal pro-Western Serbian society while
relying on the communal principles of Serbian political culture.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
CONCLUSION
In Serbia the historic past of the Serbian people reflects in the present. It remains alive
in Serbian national, cultural, and historic identity and manifests itself through the political
culture of the Serbs. A pillar of Serbian national and cultural identity remains the myth of the
"Battle of Kosovo" which continues to shape Serbian national consciousness. Since the late
fourteenth century the myth of the "Battle of Kosovo" has been used by the Serbian Orthodox
Church and Serbia's political leaders to consolidate Serbian national identity, particularly during
times of national struggle and triumph. The "Battle of Kosovo" dictates to the Serbs their
national and historic past through a false pretext of the defeat of the Serbian Christians by the
Ottoman Muslims in the late fourteenth century. The event emerges as a context for divine
revelation, that the Serb's are God's chosen people and that as such they must endure all threats
to their possible extinction.
Aside from the "Battle of Kosovo" serving as the Serbs' raison d'être during the period of
Ottoman colonization, this myth largely shaped the Serbian national revival movement of the
nineteenth century and Serbian nationalism under the regime of Slobodan Milošević in the late
twentieth century. The "Battle of Kosovo" continues to give the Serbs a sense of national,
cultural and historic identity despite overwhelming historical evidence that exposes its fallacies.
The myth of the "Battle of Kosovo" and the social organization of Serbian society under
the Ottoman Empire socialized Serbs to have little input on the political and economic decisionmaking processes making the Serbs vulnerable to paternalism. Decision-making was left to
omnipotent rulers, those personifying heroic martyrs of the Battle of Kosovo, who promised to
rule in the best interests of collective Serb society. Paternalism impeded the spread of
democracy, the implementation of the rule of law, and the development of constitutionalism in
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nineteenth century Serbian society and later in the late twentieth century under the Milošević
regime. Nonetheless, Serbian political culture allowed for the spread of communist ideology and
the installment of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Serbian society.
Paternalism, but also foreign power influence, led the Serbs to develop a collective
sentiment of victimhood. Under the Ottoman Empire, the Serbian Orthodoxy relied on the good
will of the Porte to practice their religion and customs and to maintain economically viable living
conditions. Collective Serbian sentiment of victimhood extended into the mid-nineteenth
century despite Serbian state independence. In this period, Serbia's geopolitical interests clashed
with those of Austria-Hungary which prevented Serbia from expanding its borders westward and
southwestward and developing its economy independent of Russian or Ottoman protection.
National victimhood mentality led Serbian policymakers to unite politically with the other South
Slavs in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1917 and the Communist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945.
During the cold war, Serbian sentiment of helplessness over its nation future due to
foreign power influence greatly decreased as the Yugoslav communists maintained a non-aligned
posture in Yugoslavia's foreign relations, staving off the political influences of the United States
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Nonetheless, this sentiment returned in the early
nineties as the United Nations Security Council imposed political and economic sanctions on
Serbia under the Milošević regime due to the activities of the Serbs in the Yugoslav wars. The
West, most significantly the United States, continued to promote its influence on Serbia after the
disappearance of the communist regime by investing millions of dollars in Serbia's opposition
parties and non-profit organizations. The future of the Serbs largely depended on the foreign
policy of the United States. Most Serbs continue to feel helpless about the direction of their
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country's future most likely because of the West's pressure on Serbia to become a member state
of the European Union.
After the fall of Milošević Serbs enthusiastically embraced Serbia's process of
democratization and its accession into the European Union however only to become discouraged
by the European Union's persistence on Serbia's cooperation with the International Criminal
Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the recognition of its member states of Kosovo as
an independent state. In 2001, Serbia, within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, began its
ongoing journey towards becoming a European Union membership state by signing the
Stabilisation and Association Process. Under this Process, Serbia must meet the Copenhagen
Criteria, as expressed by the 1993 European Council, in order to become a signatory to the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which would make Serbia a potential candidate
for European Union membership.138 A central demand of the EU in the SAA has been that
Serbian government cooperate with the ICTY and extradite all outstanding alleged war
criminals. Less than six months after Serbia's October Revolution, the Serbian government
under Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić arrested and extradited Milošević to the ICTY on charges
of genocide and crimes against humanity while in July 2008 the Serbian government extradited
alleged war criminal Radovan Karadzić to the ICTY also on charges of genocide and crimes
against humanity.139 The extradition of Milošević and Karadzić were a priority for the ICTY
because of the graveness of their charges; with their extradition Serbia has made a good faith
effort to comply with the ICTY.
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In April 2008 Serbia's potential candidacy status for EU membership was granted
prematurely in order to stave off increasing anti-EU sentiment among the Serbs following the
recognition of EU member states of Kosovo's independence in February 2008. After the EU's
political maneuver, general Serb feeling towards the EU became one of distrust and resentment
since the Serbs realized that potential candidacy status was a trade-off for Kosovo's
independence. Furthermore, the EU's position on Serbia reinforced Serbian sentiment of
victimhood and powerlessness making the Serbs indifferent to their country’s accession to the
EU.
Nonetheless, despite political setbacks and prevailing apathy, Serbia has made significant
political and economic strides in its fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria as reported in the EU
Commission's "Serbia 2009 Progress Report". According to the Report, in the area of democracy
and the rule of law, Serbia has been successfully cooperating with the ICTY and consolidating
the rule of law and democracy; improvement still remains necessary in the effective
implementation of Serbia's laws and the decrease of corruption in public administration,
procurement, and privatization.140 The Report notes, however, that greater improvement also
remains necessary in human rights and the protection of minorities, particularly in improving
legal mechanisms that allow greater access to justice through free legal aid, prison reform, the
freedom of expression- prohibiting hate speech and increasing media transparency, and in
promoting gender equality and the protection of women and children from violence, and in
promoting anti-discrimination against minorities.141 Moreover, the Report delicately advises that
"Serbia and Kosovo need to reach pragmatic solutions enabling key regional fora to continue
fulfilling their role in advancing regional cooperation and development.142
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Despite Serbia's progress towards becoming a member of the European Union, the Serbs
continue to cling to their nation's past as they stress the greatness of the medieval Serbian Empire
and the independent Serbian state in the nineteenth and early twentieth century while they
denounce communist Yugoslavia for fragmenting the Serbian nation and dividing the Republic
of Serbia, and the United States for its NATO bombing campaign and support of Kosovo's
independence. To demonstrate the injustices of the NATO bombing campaign, the
democratically elected Serbian government left standing the ruins of the Yugoslav National
Army building on Kneza Miloša street in downtown Belgrade. Many Serbs believe that the
United States' foreign policy on the Balkans rests on the idea that Balkan stability can only be
achieved with an economically weak Serbian state. As with the Yugoslav communists, most
Serbs feel that since the early 1990s the United States consistently promotes anti-Serb foreign
policy. The Serbs again perceive themselves as victims.
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APPENDIX

Figure 1. A Scene From the Battle of Kosovo
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Figure 2. Serbian Orthodox Monasteries in Kosovo and Metohija

Figure 3. Serbian Orthodox Monastery Studenica

Figure 4. Vidovdan Celebrations During World War I
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Figure 5. Southeastern Europe in 1812

Figure 6. Southeastern Europe in 1820
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Figure 7. Southeastern Europe in 1878

Figure 8. Southeastern Europe in 1914
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Figure 9. Southeastern Europe in 1923
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Figure 10. The Effects of Pan-Slavism in Europe

Figure 11. Southeastern Europe in 1947
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Figure 12. The Collapse of Yugoslavia
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